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BANKRUPTCY
ROBERT E. GINSBERG*
During 1975-76, several significant developments occurred in the area
of bankruptcy law. Probably the most significant of these was the 1976
legislative overhaul of chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 1 the chapter
governing the rehabilitation of financially embarrassed local governmental
units. This marked the first comprehensive revision of a "chapter" proceed-
ing since the Chandler Act Amendments in 1938.2 In addition, the United
States Supreme Court completed the bankruptcy rulemaking process by
adopting rules governing proceedings under section 77,3 chapter IX,4 chapter
X5 and chapter XI16 of the Act. Finally, there were also developments in the
case law area7 ranging from consideration of a Seventh Circuit bankruptcy
decision by the United States Supreme Court to several important decisions in
the Seventh Circuit itself. This article will consider each of these
developments.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING
MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY
Chapter IX of the Act has a checkered history. During the depression of
the 1930's, many beleagured cities were unable to meet their financial
obligations and the law provided such municipalities with no available
procedures to facilitate refinancing or to force any alteration of the rights of
recalcitrant bondholders. Thus, the spectre of payless paydays and the
forfeiture of corporate charters to the state was very real. Subsequent attempts
by state legislatures to provide procedures for binding rearrangement of the
obligations of insolvent municipalities ran afoul of the constitutional prohibi-
tion on state interference with obligations under contracts.' As a result, it
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; J.D., American
University, Washington College of Law; LL.M., Harvard University Law School.
1. Bankruptcy Act §§ 81-98, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-418 (1976) [hereinafter referred to in the
text as the Act].
2. Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840-940 (1938).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
4. Bankruptcy Act §§ 81-98, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-418 (1976).
5. Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-126, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-676 (1976).
6. Bankruptcy Act §§ 401-526, 11 U.S.C. §§ 801-926 (1970).
7. See text accompanying notes 182-237 infra.
8. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 10.
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became Congress' responsibility to deal with the problem under its bankrupt-
cy power. 9
Congress' first attempt to remedy the situation in 1934 confronted
another constitutional obstacle-the tenth amendment.' 0 In Ashton v. Cam-
eron County Water Improvement District No. 7,11 the United States Supreme
Court held that if the bankruptcy power of Congress permitted the federal
courts to interfere with the obligations of state governments or subdivisions
thereof, "they are no longer free to manage their own affairs; the will of
Congress prevails over them. . . .And really, the sovereignty of the state,
so often declared necessary to the federal system, does not exist." '1 2
In response to the Supreme Court's holding, Congress drafted a revised
chapter IX which did not conflict with the tenth amendment.1 3 However, it
was this Act with relatively minor amendments in 1940, 1942, and 1946,14
which proved patently inadequate to solve the more recent financial problems
of New York City and other large, local governmental units. 15
In 1973, a Presidential Commission completed a comprehensive study
of the strengths and weaknesses of both the liquidation and reorganization
provisions of the present Act. 16 The Commission proposed a new approach to
bankruptcy in which proceedings would be jointly administered by a federal
agency, the United States Bankruptcy Administration, and federal bankrupt-
cy courts. 17 The basic thesis of the Commission was that the present
liquidation and reorganization process could be made substantially more
efficient by turning over many of the clerical functions now handled by
bankruptcy judges and bankruptcy courts to the newly conceived federal
Bankruptcy Administration. The Commission's proposal also contained
numerous recommendations for substantive changes and improvements in the
present law including major changes in connection with involuntary peti-
tions, 18 the trustee's avoiding powers,19 and a merger of chapters X, XI, and
XII of the present statute.2' The Commission's proposal was introduced in the
9. Specifically, the bankruptcy clause states that: "[tihe Congress shall have the power
. ..[t]o establish. . . uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States
. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
11. 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
12. Id. at 531.
13. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
14. See generally 5 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 546-57 (14th ed. 1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as COLLIER].
15. 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-404 (1970).
16. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Pts. I,
II, III, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
17. REPORT, supra note 15, Pt. I at 103-156.
18. Id. at 185-191.
19. Id. at 200-212.
20. Id. at 237-262.
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United States House of Representatives during the 94th Congress. 21
Soon after the Commission's report was published, the bankruptcy
judges drafted their own proposal for widespread legislative revision of the
Act. The judges' proposal encompassed administration of all aspects of
liquidation and reorganization proceedings by the bankruptcy courts and
judges without participation of an independent federal bureaucracy in the
process. The judges agreed with the Commission's conclusions that many of
the substantive provisions of the present statute needed major overhaul and
made proposals for such changes which were, in many instances, identical to
those proposed by the Commission. The judges' bill was also introduced in
the 94th Congress.22
In 1975-76, extensive hearings were held on both bills before the House
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on
the Judiciary. Initially, it was expected that the Senate would conduct
hearings on the proposed bankruptcy legislation during the next session and
that Congress would enact an all encompassing revision of the existing Act
within the next year.
However, the need to remedy specific flaws under the existing chapter
on municipal bankruptcy was so immediate that our nation's cities could not
wait for an omnibus bill to be passed by Congress. 23 By 1975, the financial
condition of New York City had become critical. Default appeared imminent.
Envisioning chaos and disaster, Mayor Beame, Wall Street attorneys and
Congress all turned to the Act to see what provisions it offered to aid this
economically troubled municipality in putting its financial house back in
order. When Congress, the bar of New York and the financial community
looked to the long forgotten chapter IX of the Act, they discovered to their
great surprise that the draftsmen of chapter IX never contemplated the
insolvency of the nation's largest city and that chapter IX provided no
alternatives for relief to New York City. For this reason, in 1975-76,
Congress focused its specific attention on the problem of municipal insolven-
cy. On April 8, 1976, a new version of chapter IX of the Act was enacted 24
and on April 26, 1976, the chapter IX Rules and Official Forms were ordered
to become effective by the United States Supreme Court on August 1, 1976.25
21. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
22. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
23. As early as 1973, the Commission anticipated the possibility of a major municipal
collapse as well as the inadequacy of chapter IX to deal with such an event. In one of its most
sanguine observations the Commission said: "There have been some 350 odd cases filed under
Chapter IX . . . . However, since the early 1950's only a handful of cases has been filed. For
fiscal year 1972, only one case was filed in the United States. The present calm may well be
ending." REPORT, supra note 15, Pt. I at 273.
24. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315.
25. 11 U.S.C.A. app. Sup. Ct. Order of Aug. 26, 1976.
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Initiation of Proceedings
Chapter IX of the Act as it existed in the beginning of 1976 was designed
to solve the problems of a relatively small governmental unit. The main
purpose of chapter IX was to provide a framework within which a financially
troubled irrigation district, small municipality or county could continue to
operate while working out a deal with a recalcitrant minority of investor
creditors. The theory was that the local governmental unit in financial trouble
would begin to make a deal with its creditors, get the approval of a majority of
them and then use chapter IX to bind the dissenters. Specifically, chapter IX
required the petitioner to have the approval of fifty-one percent of its creditors
to a plan of adjustment before being eligible to file a petition. 26
Such a provision may have made sense in the case of a drainage district
where the creditors could be readily identified and negotiated with. However,
it presented an impossible precondition in the case of New York City or any
other unit with large numbers of outstanding securities holders.
The most significant change contained in the 1976 Act is in the area of
eligibility for relief. Under the new section 84,27 any political subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of a state is eligible for chapter IX relief if it: (1) is
generally authorized by the state to file for relief;28 (2) is insolvent in either the
bankruptcy (balance sheet) sense or unable to meet its debts; and (3) has
either obtained the approval of fifty-one percent of its creditors to its plan, or
at least negotiated with its creditors, shown why such negotiation is impracti-
cal or presented sufficient evidence that an unsecured creditor will try to grab
a portion of its assets. 29 In effect, this opens the courthouse door to any
insolvent State governmental unit.3"
26. Former Bankruptcy Act § 83(a), 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970 (amended 1976).
27. Bankruptcy Act § 84, 11 U.S.C.A. § 404 (1976).
28. The House of Representatives' version would have permitted the entity to file if it was
not "prohibited by state law from filing a petition under this chapter." H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975). That was changed in Conference to require "general authorization by
the legislature, or by a governmental officer (which includes the chief executive) or government
organization (such as a Municipal Finance Commission) empowered by State law to authorize
filing." CONF. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976). Thus, there apparently must be some
affirmative indication of authority by the state that the entity may file a chapter IX petition. That
is a change in prior law which has the effect of making the relief available under chapter IX more
difficult to obtain. See generally 5 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 1564-65. Since the affirmative
consent of the state is not constitutionally required (United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 46
(1938)), the logic behind raising a technical barrier to relief is unclear. If the state's consent is to
be required, the debtor should be allowed to obtain it at any time up to the confirmation of the
plan, with the proceeding being dismissed if the debtor is unable to obtain the state's authority.
See Bankruptcy Act §§ 94(b)(6), 98(b), 11 U.S.C.A. § 414(b)(6), 418 (b) (1976). The chaotic
emergency conditions which will inevitably precede a chapter IX petition should not be made
even more uncertain by the need to obtain the state's permission before filing.
29. Bankruptcy Act § 84, 11 U.S.C.A. § 404 (1976).
30. There is no limit as to the size of the entity which can use chapter IX. Although there
was some discussion of making the relief provided by the 1976 Act available only to large cities,
that restriction was dropped and the new Act applies equally to large and small municipalities.
Bankruptcy Act § 84, 11 U.S.C.A. § 404 (1976).
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Administration of Proceedings
Once the petition is filed, the chief judge of the district notifies the chief
judge of the corresponding circuit, and the court of appeals judge designates
the district judge who is to hear the case. 31 The case cannot be referred to a
bankruptcy judge generally, although a bankruptcy judge may hear specific
aspects of the case as a special master.32 The court's jurisdiction is limited to
matters concerning the debtor's financial difficulties and the plan for solving
those difficulties. The local governmental officials and the state remain in
control of the affairs of local government in accordance with state law.33
Under the Constitution, an elected or appointed state official cannot be
replaced by a federal official, and thus, an independent bankruptcy trustee is
not appointed. 34 For much the same reason the proceedings are strictly
voluntary. There is no involuntary chapter IX petition and either the state or
debtor can terminate the case at any time by withdrawing its consent to the
proceeding. 35
Once the proceeding is underway, the Act provides for participation of a
variety of parties in the process leading to the adoption and implementation of
a plan. Whereas the former chapter IX contemplated negotiation with secured
or unsecured creditors who were the holders of securities, i.e., investor
creditors, 36 the new Act unequivocally includes all of the debtor's investor
31. Bankruptcy Act § 82(d), I1 U.S.C.A. § 402(d) (1976).
32. Bankruptcy Act § 87(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 407(a) (1976); Bankruptcy Rule 9-13, 11
U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-13 (1976). Only a bankruptcy judge can serve as special master. However,
any references of any part of the case is to be done only in extraordinary cases. Id. See also the
definitions of "court" in section 81 (1i U.S.C.A. 401 (1976)) and "court" and "judge" in rule
9-38(6) (11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-38(6) (1976)).
33. Bankruptcy Act § 83(a), I 1 U.S.C.A. § 403(a) (1976). See text accompanying notes 11-12
supra which points out that interference with local and state sovereignty would invalidate
chapter IX under the tenth amendment. For this reason, the court's role "is strictly limited to
disapproving or to approving and carrying out a proposed composition." Leco Properties v. R.E.
Crummer & Co., 128 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1942). See generally H.R. REP. No. 686,94th Cong.,
1 st Sess. 9-11 (1975). On the other hand, the states cannot enact competing municipal insolvency
legislation which would be binding on dissenters without running into the supremacy clause of the
Constitution. Bankruptcy Act § 83, 11 U.S.C.A. § 403 (1976). See International Shoe Co. v.
Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
34. A trustee can be appointed for the limited purpose of pursuing causes of action under
the bankruptcy trustee's powers to avoid preferences, fraudulent conveyances, and certain
statutory and judicial liens under sections 60, 67, and 70 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. §§ 96,
107, 110 (1970)). The trustee is appointed only if the debtor refuses to pursue the matter and then
only for the limited purpose of pursuing the action. Bankruptcy Act § 85(h), 11 U.S.C.A. § 405(h)
(1976). This represents a change in the law from the previous chapter IX where it was believed the
bankruptcy trustee's avoiding powers were unavailable. 5 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 1597-99.
See text accompanying notes 91-95 infra.
35. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 10-11 (1975).
36. Former Bankruptcy Act § 82, 11 U.S.C. § 402 (1970) (amended 1976). A "creditor" was
a holder of a "security." Id. The definition of "security" included "bonds, notes, judgments,
claims and demands, liquidated or unliquidated, and other evidences of indebtedness either
secured or unsecured, and certificates of beneficial interest in property." Id. The courts gave this
definition a broad scope and included creditors in chapter IX whose claims could hardly be
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and non-investor, secured and unsecured creditors in the proceeding. 37
In addition to the debtor and its creditors, there are a number of other,
potential parties to the proceeding. The state and the United States Treasury
Department are entitled to participate. Further, the statute provides that the
Securities and Exchange Commission 31 is to serve the same investor protec-
tion role in chapter IX as it presently serves in chapter X corporate reorganiza-
tion proceedings. 39 Also, labor unions may be heard on the economic
soundness of the plan with the permission of the court.40
Secured and unsecured creditors can participate pro se, by attorney, or
by committee or representative.41 Committees of creditors, their attorneys
and attorneys for petitioners must disclose all compensation arrangements
and can petition the court for awards of compensation from the debtor.42
Although there seemed to be an intent to democratize the rehabilitation
process, the statute encourages efficient administration of the proceeding
through the participation of powerful, centralized creditor representatives
such as indenture trustees and unions.43
considered investment related. Poinsett Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Drainage Dist. No. 7, 119 F.2d
270 (8th Cir. 1941). Nevertheless, while the thrust of former chapter IX was investor-related, the
new chapter IX is not so limited.
37. Bankruptcy Act § 81(3), 11 U.S.C.A. § 401(3) (1976). Creditors must, however, be
creditors of the petitioner. Thus, holders of industrial development bonds issued by local
governments on behalf of private businesses under the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. § 103 (c))
are not within the chapter IX definition of creditor. Since only the private business is liable for
payment on these bonds, they are not affected by chapter IX. See CONF. REP. No. 938 on H.R.
10624, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976).
38. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the SEC.
39. Although section 93 seems to contemplate a role for the SEC limited to objecting to
unfair plans (11 U.S.C.A. § 413 (1976)), Bankruptcy Rule 9-15(b) is not so limited but instead
contemplates full participation by the SEC as a party with the same limitation on the SEC's right
of appeal which appears in chapter X. 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-15(b) (1976). Compare Bankruptcy
Act § 208, 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1970) and Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(c), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-210(c)
(1976).
40. Bankruptcy Act § 94(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 414(a) (1976). Unions can also participate more
actively as a representative of employee creditors in connection with unpaid wages or damages
from the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. See Bankruptcy Act§ 86(a), 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 406(a) (1976).
41. Bankruptcy Act § 86(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 406(a) (1976); Bankruptcy Rules 9-15(a), 9-16,
9-43, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-15(a), 9-16, 9-43 (1976).
42. Bankruptcy Act §§ 86(b), 87(b), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 406(b), 407(b) (1976); Bankruptcy Rules
9-16, 9-19, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-16, 9-19 (1976). Rule 9-19 adds a weakened version of the
anti-trading provision of section 249 of chapter X to chapter IX. I I U.S.C. § 649 (1970). The rule
forbids compensation to those acting in a representative capacity who have traded in the
petitioner's securities without court permission after the inception of the chapter IX proceeding
or after the beginning of the representation. (Bankruptcy Rule 9-19(c)(2)). Neither it nor section
249 requires the representative or insider to disgorge profits* The rule is that they can trade or
receive compensation from the debtor but not both. The rule is meant to discourage insider
trading, not to prohibit it. However, rule 9-19(c)(2) weakens section 249 by permitting the court to
prospectively or retroactively sanction voluntary trading by fiduciaries in chapter IX proceed-
ings, something section 249 does not give the court discretion to do. Thus, a chapter IX court
could permit both trading and compensation. The rule has been similarly weakened by the
chapter X rules. See Bankruptcy Rule 10-215(c)(4), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-215(c)(4) (1976).
43. One other party, the "special taxpayer," is entitled to be heard in objection to a plan.
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The principal purpose of chapter IX is the negotiation and implementa-
tion of a plan to solve the debtor's financial ills. In this area, the new Act adds
a number of provisions designed to facilitate the negotiation process. The
filing of the petition acts as an automatic stay of all creditors' actions against
the debtor, its property, officers, or inhabitants. This includes staying any
rights of set-off, particularly against compensating balances.' In addition,
the chapter IX debtor is now expressly given the power to reject executory
contracts and unexpired leases. 45 This provision, which is similar to section
70b,46 may become important in connection with collective bargaining
agreements. 47 The debtor can now compel unions, landlords and others who
may be parties to long term contracts which are regarded by the debtor as
onerous to renegotiate on terms more acceptable to the debtor.
On the other hand, the debtor-petitioner is protected against ipso facto
clauses in leases, i.e., clauses which purport to work an automatic termina-
tion of the lease upon the bankruptcy of the lessee.48 Such clauses, which are
specifically enforceable in straight bankruptcy under section 70b, have not
been enforced by the courts in corporate reorganizations under chapters X and
XI. 4 9 The new Act makes them specifically unenforceable in chapter IX
proceedings. Thus, while an insolvent governmental tenant cannot be sum-
marily evicted, the landlord is entitled to all unpaid rent plus adequate
assurances of future performance under the lease. The ball is clearly in the
debtor's court. If the lease is regarded by the debtor as attractive, the debtor
can affirm it and the other party cannot use the fact of bankruptcy as an escape
clause. However, if the lease is unattractive to the debtor, the debtor can, at
his option, reject it and the other party is left with a claim for damages.
In an attempt to lessen the urgency of the negotiations and provide the
petitioner with operating funds during the pendency of chapter IX proceed-
ings, the new Act gives the district court judge the power to authorize the
Bankruptcy Act § 93, 11 U.S.C.A. § 413 (1976). A special taxpayer is one who because of
ownership of real estate can be singled out for special assessment to help the debtor make
payments under the plan. Although the rules give special taxpayers broad rights of participation,
(Bankruptcy Rule 9-15(a)(1), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-15(a)(1) (1976)), special taxpayers, their
committees, and attorneys are apparently not entitled to be compensated by the petitioner for
their services, even for successful objection to or negotiation of a plan. Compare Bankruptcy
Act § 87, 11 U.S.C.A. § 407 (1976) with Bankruptcy Act § 243, 11 U.S.C. § 643 (1970).
44. Bankruptcy Act § 85(e), 11 U.S.C.A. § 405(e) (1976).
45. Bankruptcy Act 99 82(b)(1), 88(c), 11 U.S.C.A. 99 402(b)(1), 408(c) (1976).
46. Bankruptcy Act § 70(b), 11 U.S.C.A. § I10(b) (1970).
47. If a collective bargaining agreement is rejected, it will presumably be renegotiated in
accordance with state and local law. King, Municipal Insolvency, Chapter IX Old and New,
Chapter IX Rules, 50 AM. BANK. L.J. 55, 62 (1976).
48. Bankruptcy Act § 85(f), II U.S.C.A. § 405(f) (1976).
49. Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974) (chapter
XI); Weaver v. Hutson, 459 F.2d 741, 744 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 957 (1972)
(chapter X).
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debtor to issue certificates of indebtedness. 50 This method of funding, which
is common to other reorganization proceedings, 5 permits an insolvent entity
to obtain operating funds by selling certificates for cash. These certificates
may have priority over all existing indebtedness of the debtor, secured or
unsecured. Therefore, they are theoretically safe and attractive to investors
despite the insolvency of the issuer.
This device works well in the context of a relatively small debtor in a
fairly quick proceeding such as a chapter XI arrangement. There, the amounts
the lender is being asked to risk are small and the grant of the highest
repayment priority makes repayment within a reasonable period of time
dependable. This logic collapses in the context of the insolvency of a large
governmental unit. As pointed out by Representative Holtzman in an adden-
dum to House Committee Report No. 686,52 the mere grant of authority to
issue certificates of indebtedness does not mean that such will in fact be
saleable and that the petitioner will be assured adequate operating funds.
Certificates of indebtedness can hardly be considered a risk free investment in
light of the fact that the statute specifically subordinates certificates to
operating expenses of the debtor-government and, in the context of such cities
as New York or Chicago, a chapter IX proceeding is likely to be a drawn out
affair stretching out over one or more decades. The Penn Central experience
tends to confirm Representative Holtzman's suggestion that absent federal
guarantees, the financial community will not touch these certificates. 53
This is a serious deficiency in the new municipal insolvency procedure,
one which Congress will have to remedy on an ad hoc basis by federal,
guarantees at least in the context of a debtor of anything more than modest
size. Chapter IX will not work for New York City unless it can be assured of
the funds to maintain vital services, such as police and fire protection, during
the lengthy process of negotiating a settlement with its innumerable creditors.
The Plan of Reorganization
The new Act assists the petitioner greatly in negotiating with creditors by
giving the court broad authority to classify creditors. 4 Previously, the courts
were required to place all secured claims in a separate class and claims
payable out of the same source had to be placed in the same class. 55 This
50. Bankruptcy Act § 82(b)(2), 11 U.S.C.A. § 402(b)(2) (1976).
51. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 77(c)(3), 116(2), 344, 446, I1 U.S.C. §§ 205(c)(3), 516(2),
744, 846 (1970). These sections are included under railroad reorganization, chapters X, XI and
XII respectively.
52. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1975).
53. Id.
54. Bankruptcy Act § 88(b), 11 U.S.C.A. § 408(b) (1976); Bankruptcy Rule 9-22(g), 11
U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-22(g) (1976).
55. Former Bankruptcy Act § 83(b), 11 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1970) (amended 1976). See 5
COLLIER, supra note 14, at 1579-81.
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resulted in some glaring inequities because claims with differing rights
against the same fund or property were in one class and, therefore, had to
receive identical treatment. This requirement that the debtor settle on identi-
cal terms with creditors with differing, often conflicting interests, made the
negotiating process delicate and difficult. The new statute corrects this
difficulty and facilitates negotiations when it permits the court wide latitude in
identifying classes of creditors with homogenous interests and rights for
purposes of the plan. This enables the petitioner and each group of creditors to
settle on such different terms as fairly meet the rights and needs of each
particular group.
To help the debtor, the statute permits the court to carve out a special
class of creditors, those having claims of $250 or less, "for administrative
convenience." 56 Presumably, these creditors will be paid in full immediately
and, thus, the expense of administering the case will be greatly reduced by
substantially reducing the number of creditors who would otherwise be
entitled to various notices and opportunities to be heard as well as to vote on
the plan. 57
Under the new Act only the petitioner can propose such a plan. Neither
the court nor the creditors can propose competing plans which could be
binding on the debtor. 58 As to the terms of the plan itself, the new statute
provides a scheme which is basically similar to the former chapter IX but has
several significant departures as well.
Similar to the former chapter IX, the new Act provides that, for a plan to
be adopted, all three of the following conditions must be met: (1) the plan
must be proposed by the debtor; 59 (2) a sufficient number of the creditors must
agree to it;60 and (3) a court of competent jurisdiction must determine that the
plan agreed to meets the requirements of the statute .61 If any one of these three
steps is lacking, the proceeding fails. Each of these steps is independent of the
others. Thus, even if ninety-five percent of the debtor's creditors of each class
consent to an unfair and inequitable plan, the court cannot approve it. On the
other hand, the court may not approve a patently fair and equitable plan if it is
not approved by the requisite majorities of each class of creditors affected by
the plan. 62
56. Bankruptcy Act § 88(b), II U.S.C.A. § 408(b) (1976).
57. See generally 9 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 230. A question arises as to whether this
would permit payment of unsecured debenture holders with claims of less then $250 before
mortgage bondholders or revenue bondholders receive anything. See also In re Hudson-Ross,
Inc., 175 F. Supp. 111, 112 (N.D. I11. 1959).
58. Bankruptcy Act § 90(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 410(a) (1976); Bankruptcy Rule 9-24(a). 11
U.S.C. app. R. 9-24(a) (1976). However, a creditor can, with the written permission of the debtor,
file a modification of a plan filed by the petitioner. Bankruptcy Act § 90(b); Bankruptcy Rule 9-26.
59. Bankruptcy Act § 90(a), II U.S.C.A. § 410(a) (1976).
60. Bankruptcy Act § 92(b), 11 U.S.C.A. § 412(b) (1976).
61. Bankruptcy Act § 94(b), 11 U.S.C.A. § 414(b) (1976).
62. See generally AmericanUnited Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940).
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The plan must be approved by two-thirds in amount of each class of
claims against the debtor and a simple majority in number of the members of
each class of the debtors' creditors. 63 This is a hybrid between the approach of
former section 83(d)64 of chapter IX (two-thirds in amount only) and present
section 36265 of chapter XI (a simple majority of number and amount). The
precise reason for the dual requirement is not clear.
What is clear, however, is that this vote is a separate, additional, and
distinct requirement from confirmation by the court. The court cannot force a
plan on unwilling investors.' s In deciding how to vote, the creditors receive
either the plan itself (which is likely to be too long and incomprehensible for
the average creditor) and/or a "summary thereof approved by the court." 67
Unfortunately, neither the Act nor the Bankruptcy Rules68 set forth any
procedure for the court to approve a summary of a plan or suggest whose
summary this is to be. Perhaps it is to be done at the first meeting of
creditors .69
The creditors are also to receive "any analysis" of the plans before
voting.70 Presumably, the reference made in this provision is to an advisory
report on the plan prepared and filed by the SEC as under chapter X. 71
Under section 97, however, the plan can be one like the New York municipal assistance exchange
plan which has been offered to investors and partially completed before the filing under the
Bankruptcy Act. Fleshing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp. for the City of New York, 40
N.Y.2d 731, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). See also Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York, 415 F. Supp. 577
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). In such case, the prior exchanges count as assenting votes. 11 U.S.C.A. § 417
(1976).
63. Bankruptcy Act § 92(b), 11 U.S.C.A. § 412(b) (1976). Section 92(c) and Bankruptcy Rule
9-25 (11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-25 (1976)) outline the criteria for computing the vote of creditors.
Generally, only a creditor whose claim has been finally allowed can vote and the computation of
the necessary majorities is based only on the actual votes cast. Abstentions do not count. This
makes the debtor's task easier than under the former chapter IX which requires the debtor to
obtain the written consent of the holders of two-thirds of the total claims against it. Thus, under
the former chapter IX an abstention was a "No" vote.
64. Former Bankruptcy Act § 83(d), 11 U.S.C. § 403(d) (1970).
65. Bankruptcy Act § 362, 11 U.S.C. § 762 (1970).
66. The statute does have a cram-down provision for dealing with a class of recalcitrant
creditors. See Bankruptcy Act §92(d), 11 U.S.C.A. §412(d) (1976). This provision cannot be used
to deal with a reluctant minority within a class. H.R. REP. No. 686,94th Cong., Ist Sess. 31(1975).
67. Bankruptcy Rule 9-24(b), I I U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-24(b) (1976) (emphasis supplied).
68. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the Rules.
69. But see Bankruptcy Rule 9-17(b) which contains an agenda of the first meeting without
mentioning the plan or a summary thereof. 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-17(b) (1976). The draftsmen's
comments suggest the approval will precede the first meeting of creditors. By way of contrast,
sections 169-175 (11 U.S.C. §§ 569-575 (1970)) and Rules 10-301 to 10-305 (11 U.S.C.A. app. R.
10-301 to 10-305 (1976)) set out a clear court-supervised procedure in chapter X for ensuring that
the investors have adequate information about a plan before voting on it. In chapter X, before any
document soliciting voter approval of a plan can be presented to those affected by the plan, there
are hearings after appropriate notice at which a record with respect to the plan is developed.
Subsequently, the court is to approve a plan for submission to affected interests. Bankruptcy Act
§ 176; Bankruptcy Rule 10-304.
70. Bankruptcy Act § 90(b), 11 U.S.C.A. § 410(b) (1976); Bankruptcy Rule 9-24(b), I 1
U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-24(b) (1976).
71. See section 172 of chapter X (11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970)); Bankruptcy Rule 10-303, 11
U.S.C. app. R. 10-303 (1976).
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However, the SEC will also need a hearing of some sort in which to develop
the record on which such an advisory report is to be based.72 Unfortunately,
neither the Act nor the Rules provides for such a hearing. The Rules should be
amended to provide the same three step process of preliminary court approval
after the full hearing, investor vote, and final court confirmation which now
exists in chapter X. 73 Such procedures would assure a fair and informed vote
by investors on the merits of the plan.
As under former chapter IX, the plan proposed by the debtor and
approved by the creditors must be fair and equitable or it cannot be confirmed
by the court.74 However, the draftsmen turning to chapter X75 and X176 added
the additional requirement that it be "feasible."77
Fairness of the Plan
The fair and equitable phrase in bankruptcy reorganization embodies the
"absolute priority" rule which, in the corporate context, requires that senior
classes be compensated in full before any lower, junior class can receive
anything for settling their claims against the debtor.7" In the context of a
72. Bankruptcy Rule 10-303(a), 11 U.S.C. app. R. 10-303(a) (1976).
73. In chapter X, a hearing is held after which the court may or must, depending upon the
amounts involved, submit any plan or plans it finds "worthy of consideration" to the SEC for an
advisory report. Thereafter, another hearing may be held to explore questions raised in the SEC
report. Next, the court approves the plan and it is submitted to those affected by it for a vote.
Finally, if the requisite majorities approve the plan, and if the court is satisfied that the plan
accords with the requirements of chapter X, then the court confirms the plan and it is
implemented. See generally Bankruptcy Rules 10-302, 10-305, 10-307, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R.
10-302, 10-305, 10-307 (1976). See also SEC TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 141 (1944). The same
procedure should be provided in the chapter IX rules.
74. Bankruptcy Act § 94(b)(1), 1I U.S.C.A. § 414(b)(1) (1976). The new statute omits the
additional test formed in former section 83(e) that the plan be "for the best interests of
creditors." 11 U.S.C. § 403(e) (1970). The draftsmen believed it to be redundant. H.R. REP. No.
686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975).
75. Bankruptcy Act § 221(2), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1970).
76. Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1970). See also Bankruptcy Act §§ 472(2),
656(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 872(2), 1056(2) (1970) (these sections are included under chapters XII and
XIII respectively).
77. Bankruptcy Act § 94(b)(1), 11 U.S.C.A. § 414(b)(1) (1976). The statute also sets up
several other requirements for a plan to be confirmed by the court which are mostly carried over
from former chapter IX. These provisions are designed to ensure that: (1) the plan does not
unfairly discriminate in favor of any creditor or class of creditors; (2) it complies with chapter IX;
(3) all payments to attorneys and others under the plan have been fully disclosed; (4) the debtor is
acting in good faith; and (5) the debtor is not prohibited by state law from fulfilling the terms of the
plan. See Advisory Committee Note accompanying Bankruptcy Rule 9-27, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R.
9-27 (1976).
78. See generally Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Consoli-
dated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 529 (1940). The effect of this rule in the corporate
context is, for example, to require the interests of the shareholders of the debtor corporation to be
cancelled unless all of the creditors of the corporation receive full payment for their claims either
in cash or securities of the reorganized corporation. Generally, it requires valuation of the
corporation to determine the value of claims against the debtor and the value of new securities
being issued in exchange for those claims. See Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414
(1968). The rule applies to railroad reorganizations under section 77 and to corporate reorganiza-
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chapter IX proceeding, the absolute priority rule has a different meaning. The
test which has been generally articulated and applied in chapter IX proceed-
ings in applying the fair and equitable standard in chapter IX is whether the
cash or new securities which a creditor has received are "all that could
reasonably be expected in all the existing circumstances." 7 9 The approach
seemed to be that the court would try to determine the amounts and sources of
reasonably anticipated future revenues and then try to decide how much of
those revenues each claimant could have expected to receive. If what was
being received in the reorganization approximated what the claimant could
reasonably have expected to receive, the plan was "fair and equitable.''80
This approach is easily workable in the context of small governmental
units with few sources of income and few classes of creditors. In smaller
cases, it is easier to identify and sort out the relative rights of each class of
creditors in each source of income. Also, it is fairly easy to produce evidence
on which to found a reasonable estimate of future income and then give each
class of claimants a settlement in cash or securities which represents a fair
exchange for that bundle of rights which that class has against the various
sources of future income. 8' The question remains, however, as to how a court
is to sort out the relative rights of each of the many classes of creditors of say
New York City, or Cook County, Illinois, with total claims in the hundreds of
millions of dollars, or even in the billions of dollars, against the innumerable
sources of income available to those entities. The problem of doing the same
thing with the rights of creditors and stockholders of an ordinary business
corporation (even one worth "only" millions of dollars) which has given the
courts enough trouble over the years, 82 pales by comparison. Such a process is
likely to require years and millions of dollars in attorneys' fees to complete, if
it can in fact be completed at all.
tions under chapter X but does not apply to chapter XI arrangement proceedings where the claims
of creditors can be scaled down without any reduction of the interests of shareholders. See
Bankruptcy Act § 366, 11 U.S.C. § 766 (1970).
79. See, e.g., West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Meced Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 654,685 (9th Cir.
1940), cert. denied 311 U.S. 718 (1941).
80. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court explained that:
[W]here future tax revenues are the only source to which creditors can look for
payment of their claims, considered estimates of those revenues constitute the only
available basis for appraising the respective interests of different classes of creditors.
In order that a court may determine the fairness of the total amount of cash or
securities offered to creditors by the plan, the court must have before it data which will
permit a reasonable and, hence, an informed estimate of the probable future revenues
available for the satisfaction of creditors. And where, as here, different classes of
creditors assert prior claims to different sources of revenue, there must be a determina-
tion of the extent to which each class is entitled to share in a particular source, and of
the fairness of the allotment to each class in the light of the probable revenues to be
anticipated from each source.
Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1943).
81. See, e.g., Taylor v. Provident Irrigation Dist., 123 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 821 (1942).
82. See, e.g., Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968).
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The negotiated composition approach of chapter XI, rather than the strict
priority approach of chapter X, seems to be more appropriate to chapter IX.
The absolute priority rule is a device to prevent junior classes of interest from
overreaching by fraud or weight of numbers the interests of senior creditor
classes. The rule is not constitutionally required. Municipal insolvency is
hardly the context in which those in control of the debtor are going to be guilty
of fraud and overreaching vis-a-vis the interests of small, widely scattered,
unsophisticated investors with senior claims. This is so, particularly in light
of the participation by the SEC in the proceeding. It would seem to be in the
best interests of the debtor-municipality and its public investor creditors to
wind-up the proceeding as quickly as possible in order to remove the cloud
hanging over the city and to get the flow of payments to the public investors
started again. This can best be done by eliminating the absolute priority rule
from chapter IX.83
The new Act adds a new twist to chapter IX proceedings-the creation of
priority, unsecured creditor classes. The plan must provide for full payment,
ahead of all other secured and unsecured creditors, of: (1) the costs of
administration; (2) obligations due on account of services or supplies pro-
vided the debtor within three months before the petition; and (3) all secured
and unsecured claims of the United States. 84
The concept of statutory priorities is new in chapter IX. However,
priorities have long been employed for some time now in straight bankruptcy
and in certain arrangement proceedings under the Act. 5 However, the section
6486 priority provision differs from section 8987 in one significant respect.
Whereas section 64 orders priorities among unsecured creditors after the lien
claims of secured creditors have been paid in full, section 89 mandates
payments to certain types of creditors before the payments to secured
creditors and without regard to whether the claim of the priority creditor is
secured or unsecured. While it is not clear that Congress intended this result,
the definitions of "creditor" and "claim" in chapter IX strongly indicate that
chapter IX mandates a substantial reordering of priorities. 88 The effect of the
new priority rules of chapter IX seem to greatly increase the risk taken by
83. See REPORT, supra note 15, Pt. II at 270, which recognizes the inappropriateness of the
fair and equitable standard in municipal bankruptcies.
84. Bankruptcy Act § 89, 11 U.S.C.A. § 409 (1976).
85. See section 64(a) (11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970)) which applies in a straight bankruptcy,
chapter XI, and section 659 of chapter XIII (11 U.S.C. § 1059 (1970)). There is no priority
provision as such in chapter X. See Bankruptcy Act§§ 199,216(3), 11 U.S.C. §§ 599,616(3) (1970).
86. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
87. Bankruptcy Act § 89, 11 U.S.C.A. § 409 (1976).
88. Bankruptcy Act §§ 81(1), 81(3), 11 U.S.C.A. §§401(1) 401(3)(1976). Section 89 requires
the priority "creditors" to "be paid in full in advance of any distribution to creditors under the
plan." I I U.S.C.A. § 409 (1976). A "creditor" is defined in section 81(3) as a holderof a "claim."
A "claim" is defined in section 81(1) to include both secured and unsecured claims.
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investors in municipal bonds by forcing a reordering of contractual priorities
in a bankruptcy proceeding.
The notion of affording priority to the costs of administering a proceed-
ing and claims arising from the operation of a debtor in some given period
immediately before the filing of a petition is not unknown in bankruptcy and
reorganization. Costs of administration must be afforded a high priority in
order to insure that the debtor will be able to both continue its operations after
bankruptcy and secure the assistance of capable experts such as attorneys and
accountants in working out its financial difficulties. Administration claims
have therefore enjoyed a priority, for example, in chapter X, ahead of even
secured claims.89 There is no reason why administration claims should not
enjoy a similar priority in chapter IX proceedings as well. Public policy
requires the continued functioning of the debtor government during the
pendency of the chapter IX proceeding. The only way this can be assured is if
those who supply the debtor with goods and services and otherwise fund the
debtor during the chapter IX case have prior assurance that they are not
throwing good money after bad.
The first priority of section 89(1) should give workers, suppliers and
bankruptcy counsel such assurance, thus keeping city hall, the police depart-
ment, and the fire station open despite the bankruptcy. It can be presumed that
municipal bondholders knew that their claims would be subordinated to
administration claims in the event of insolvency at the time they purchased
their securities.
Similarly, the priority afforded those claims arising from the operation
of the debtor in the three months immediately preceding the petition is in
effect, a "six months rule" only cut in half. Specifically, the "six months
rule" is the railroad reorganization doctrine which affords priority, even over
secured claims, to claims of creditors whose claims arose from operations of
the railroad in the six months immediately preceding approval of a section 77
petition. 9 Its purpose is to encourage people to continue to deal with the
debtor even though bankruptcy appears imminent. The provision makes good
sense in chapter IX where the public interest requires continuity of services by
the government even in the face of impending bankruptcy.
89. See 6A COLLIER, supra note 14, at 430-37. The priority of the administration claims over
the secured claim may be limited to those situations where the chapter X proceeding benefited the
secured creditor by, for example, preserving going-concern values. However, since such
benefits can be routinely shown, administration claims in chapter X as a general rule can be said
to enjoy a priority even over secured claims.
90. Wise v. Chicago, Rock Is. & Pac. Ry. Co. (In re Chicago, Rock Is. & Pac. Ry. Co.), 90
F.2d 312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 717 (1937); Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235 (1879). Some
case law has applied the doctrine in chapter X, at least where the continued operation of the
debtor is in the public interest. Mizrahi v. Martin (In re Hallmark Medical Serv., Inc.), 475 F.2d
801 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1003 (1973).
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In total dollar terms, the amount of these two categories of claims could
run well into seven or even eight figures. In relative terms, however, the total
amount of such claims will not represent a significant portion of the claims
against the debtor. An insolvent city will only be able to go through one or two
payless paydays before being forced to file a chapter IX petition. Thus, the
amount of "three month" priority claims will not be comparatively
significant.
The third category of priorities, on the other hand, does involve
significantly greater fiscal impact. Section 89 provides priority to "debts
owing to any person, which by the laws of the United States (other than this
Act) are entitled to priority." 91 The only non-bankruptcy, priority statute is
RS 3466.92 Since 1797, this federal statute has given priority to all claims
which the United States has against an insolvent debtor. This priority applies
in theory to secured and unsecured federal claims alike.
The real significance of RS 3466 is, of course, with federal unsecured
claims. The federal tax lien and other United States' secured claims do not
need any additional priority. A lien enables the government to be assured of
satisfaction of its claims. 93 It is the unsecured claims of the United States
which need the assistance of RS 3466.
It has long been recognized that the priority afforded federal unsecured
claims under RS 3466 does not move such claims ahead of prior, perfected,
consensual liens which others have in the debtor's property. 94 Thus, absent
section 89 (3) in the context of municipal insolvency under RS 3466, the
unsecured claims of the United States ordinarily would be subordinated to
claims of investors based on bonds secured by future tax revenues or other
property. 95
The new priority provision of section 89 (3) reverses this ancient rule and
provides that all federal claims now come ahead of all other claims (save for
administrative and "three month" claims), both secured and unsecured
against a municipal debtor. Since RS 3466 covers all United States claims
including tax or any other, the amounts of these claims in the event of
federally guaranteed loans to a municipality on the road to bankruptcy, for
91. Bankruptcy Act § 89, 11 U.S.C.A. § 409 (1976).
92. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as RS 3466].
93. Phelps v. United States, 421 U.S. 330 (1975).
94. Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 246 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 868 (1957); United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1929); Bank of
Wrangell v. Alaska Asiatic Lumber Mills, Inc., 84 F. Supp. I (D. Alas. 1949). See also United
States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480,484-85 (1941); Thelusson v. Smith, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 396 (1817).
See Bankruptcy Act § 64a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (1970), which gives unsecured claims of the
United States limited priority over other unsecured claims in straight bankruptcy.
95. Of course, once a creditor has a proper perfected lien in the debtor's assets, the United
States cannot thereafter obtain a prior lien in those same assets. United States v. New Britain, 347
U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
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example, could be substantial. Thus, a creditor who believed it had negotiated
a stable pledge of future revenues with the governmental debtor in order to
minimize the risk of the loan96 could find its security short lived in chapter IX
as it waits for years while the city tries to pay off in full an unsecured claim
owed to the federal government first.
It is unclear whether Congress intended this result or whether it is a
legislative gaffe. In any case, section 89(3) would appear to materially
increase the risk assumed by those who choose to lend to municipalities and
other local governmental units. It would seem to be a provision that such
financiers should keep in mind at the time of the investment, not at the time of
insolvency.
Feasibility of the Plan
In addition to being fair and equitable and providing for payment of
priority claims, the plan must be feasible. While both houses wrestled with
the notion of requiring the debtor to present the court with a balanced budget,
both eventually decided against that approach. 97 Instead the final bill opted
for the less rigorous feasibility test.
The feasibility requirement means that there is a reasonable pros-
pect that the petitioner will be able to perform under the plan. That
is, it must appear to the court, based on the petitioner's past and
projected future tax revenues and expenses that it will have enough
to make the payments required by the plan.98
This seems to be a sounder legislative approach. It gives the court greater
flexibility and facilitates the proof of compliance with the statutory require-
ment which is prerequisite to the approval of the plan. At the same time,
however, this approach still requires the court to protect investors by rejecting
visionary schemes for resuscitation. Also, it obviates a potential tenth
amendment (impermissible interference with local governmental powers)
objection which could arise from a strict balanced budget requirement.
Once the plan is confirmed by the court, if a disbursing agent is
appointed by the court, the debtor makes a deposit with the disbursing agency
for the consideration to be distributed under the plan. At that point, the debtor
96. Security interests in local government financing are, of course, different from security
interests in the private sector. Generally, a creditor cannot take a first mortgage on city hall since
public policy would preclude the creditor from realizing on its security by foreclosure in the event
of default. Generally, the municipality pledges a portion of certain specific or general future tax
revenues and its good faith in levying and collecting those taxes. See L. MOAK & A. HILLHOUSE,
CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 316-27 (1975). Under old chapter IX,
the creditor could generally anticipate that he would get first crack at the pledged revenues under
the plan of composition. Section 89 puts the secured creditor behind the priority claims in
distribution of the pledged revenues when they materialize. 11 U.S.C.A. § 409 (1976).
97. H.R. REP. No. 686,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60(1975); CONF. REP. No. 938,94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 21 (1976).
98. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60 (1975).
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is discharged on all of its obligations except those existing under the plan.99
Thus, the discharge does not wait until the debtor completes payments of the
obligations issued under the plan, although the court does retain jurisdiction
over the case for as long as it determines it is necessary for successful
execution of the plan. " This might be as long as the term of the longest debt
security instrument issued pursuant to the plan. 01
The significance of the immediate discharge provision is the real
possibility of a default by the debtor in meeting the obligations issued by it
under the plan. In such event, the creditors would not be allowed to assert
claims they had before the first chapter IX proceeding less any dividends
received, but could only assert in a second chapter IX proceeding the unpaid
portion of any reduced obligations issued to them under the abortive plan of
reorganization confirmed by the first chapter IX court. 02 This is certainly a
matter which the court must keep in mind in passing on the feasibility of the
plan and contemplating the possibility of requiring the debtor to submit a
balanced budget.
Other Provisions
Creditors should note one final point about the new chapter IX provision
dealing with a municipality in shaky financial condition but which is not yet in
bankruptcy. The former chapter IX was silent on the question of whether a
chapter IX debtor acquired the avoiding powers of a straight bankruptcy
trustee.103 Accordingly, it was thought that a chapter IX debtor lacked the
power to set aside preferences, or liens acquired within four months of
bankruptcy. 14 The new chapter IX changes this view and expressly provides
that the chapter IX debtor has the power to set aside preferences under section
60,105 liens acquired against it by legal proceedings within four months under
section 67a,106 fraudulent conveyances under section 67d, unperfected secur-
99. Bankruptcy Act § 95(b)(1), 11 U.S.C.A. § 415(b)(1) (1976). Actually not all claims
against the debtor are discharged. Creditors who had neither notice nor actual knowledge of the
proceeding are not affected by the discharge. Bankruptcy Act § 95(b)(2)(B). See Bankruptcy Act
§ 17a(3), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(3) (1970). In addition, the plan does not affect a claim "excepted from
discharge by . . . order confirming the plan." Bankruptcy Act § 95(b)(2)(A). While section 17 is
clearly not applicable in chapter IX, it may be that the court has equitable powers to refuse the
discharge of claims which would not be dischargeable under section 17. Thus, it would seem an
investor, who bought securities of the debtor issued on the strength of a fraudulent prospectus,
could argue that his claim should not be discharged for the policy reasons found in section 17a(2),
even if the plan has been accepted by two-thirds in amount and a simple majority in number of his
fellow investors.
100. Bankruptcy Act § 96(e), 11 U.S.C.A. § 416(e) (1976).
101. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1975).
102. Compare Bankruptcy Act § 660 of chapter XIII. 11 U.S.C. § 1060 (1970).
103. Compare Bankruptcy Act § 342 of chapter XI which expressly gives a chapter XI debtor
possession of such powers. 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1970).
104. 5 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 1597-99.
105. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
106. Bankruptcy Act § 67a, 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1970).
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ity interests under section 70c,10 7 and pursuant to section 70e, other remedies
available to its creditors under state law.10 8
The effect of these provisions is particularly ominous to unsecured
creditors who settle with the debtor within four months of the petition. Such
settlements with unsecured creditors could be preferential. 09 If the debtor
refused to welch on its pre-bankruptcy bargain with its creditors, other
creditors can compel the debtor to act by obtaining the appointment of a
trustee to derivatively pursue the cause of action. 10
It would seem, however, that these powers sound more ominous in
theory than they are in practice. This is because it would seem to be virtually
impossible to prove a case on behalf of a debtor municipality under sections
60, 67a, or 67d. An essential requirement of each of those sections is that the
party seeking to set aside a transaction or lien must prove that at the time the
transaction took place (or was perfected) the debtor was "insolvent".
"Insolvent" for these purposes is not the inability of the debtor to meet
current maturities but imports a version of the balance sheet approach to
insolvency, i.e., did the debtor's liabilities exceed its assets. 1 1I It would seem
to be an insurmountable task in all but very simple cases to prove that on any
given date the fair value of the assets of a large municipality was less than the
amount of its liabilities. Thus, the possible impact of section 89(h) in the case
of New York City is somewhat reduced. In any case, if Congress seriously
intended for the debtor or its creditors to have these avoiding powers available
as a tool in chapter IX, it would seem that the provision should be amended to
make it clear that when the insolvency of the debtor must be proved, proof of
either inability to pay debts or liabilities in excess of assets will suffice.
Summary
While it is clear that new chapter IX is a significant improvement over
the old chapter IX, particularly in providing realistic access to bankruptcy
relief for financially troubled local governments, it is also clear that the
107. Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
108. Bankruptcy Act § 85(h), II U,S.C.A. § 405(h) (1976). See also section 85(g) which
permits amounts set off by creditors within four months of bankruptcy to be recovered by the
debtor without having to show insolvency or creditor knowledge. Thus, section 68 is not available
to help creditors in chapter IX and the usefulness of protective devices such as compensating
balances is severely limited.
109. But settlements with employees and suppliers on claims accruing within three months
of bankruptcy would not be preferential in light of the high priority afforded such claims under
section 89. See also Palmer Clay Prods. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227 (1936).
110. Bankruptcy Act § 89(h), I I U.S.C.A. § 409(h) (1976). For the procedure followed in
pursuing these rights refer to Bankruptcy Rules 9-34, 9-35, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 9-34,9-35(1976).
Ill. For the purposes of sections 60 and 67a (I I U.S.C. §§ 96, 107a (1970)), the definition of
insolvency is that found in section 1(19) (11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970)). Section 67d has its own
insolvency definition, section 67(l)(d), which also focuses on the debtor's balance sheet.
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statute was written in haste. It would seem that more careful thought and
redrafting is necessary in the area of: (1) standards for the plan; (2) procedure
for consideration of the plan; (3) review by the SEC and preliminary approval
by the court of the plan before submission to a creditor vote; (4) the question
of the use by a Chapter IX debtor of the straight bankruptcy trustee's avoiding
powers; and, most importantly, (5) the priority of federal government claims.
NEW BANKRUPTCY RULES
In addition to the statutory changes in chapter IX and the adoption of
chapter IX rules, completion of the rules process was achieved in 1975-76.
On August 1, 1975, the rules for proceeding under chapters X and XII became
effective. On August 1, 1976, the final part of the Rules, Part VIII dealing
with railroad reorganizations under section 77 of the Act,"' 2 became effec-
tive. The statutory mandate given to the rulemakers was broad in that it
authorized them to go so far as to overrule the procedural provisions of the Act
by rule. 113 However, particularly in the chapter X area, the rulemakers have
stretched this mandate to the limit by taking an even broader view of what
provisions of the statute were procedural.
Chapter X Rules
Chapter X proceedings involve comprehensive, corporate reorganiza-
tion proceedings for large, public businesses. Only corporate bodies are
eligible for chapter X relief. 114 Chapter X provides that the proceeding can be
begun by voluntary or involuntary petition. '1 In all but the smallest cases, the
management of the debtor must be displaced by an independent, disinterested
trustee. 116 The trustee, with the possible assistance of the SEC, investigates
and reports to the court and the interested creditors and stockholders concern-
ing the stewardship of prior management and the debtor's future business
prospects. 117 The trustee, as well as any creditor and stockholder, proposes a
112. Bankruptcy Rules 8-1 to 8-706, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 8-1 to 8-706 (1976).
113. The enabling statute provides that:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure under the
Bankruptcy Act.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such
rules have taken effect.
28 U.S.C § 2075 (1970).
114. Bankruptcy Act §§ 126, 106(3), 11 U.S.C. §§ 526,506(3) (1970). See also Bankruptcy Act
§ 1(8).
115. Bankruptcy Act § 126, 11 U.S.C. § 526(1970); Bankruptcy Rules 10-101, 10-104, 10-105,
11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-101, 10-104, 10-105 (1976).
116. Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 10-202, 11 U.S.C.A.
app. R. 10-202 (1976).
117. Bankruptcy Act § 167, 11 U.S.C. § 567 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 10-208, 11 U.S.C.A.
app. R. 10-208 (1976).
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plan or competing plans of reorganization. 118 The court then holds a hearing
on the proposed plans, submits them to the SEC for an advisory report and
approves a plan. 11
9
The plan can affect the rights of secured creditors, unsecured creditors
and stockholders. However, the plan must be fair, equitable and feasible. In
other words, it must satisfy the absolute priority rule. Thus, before any junior
class can participate, senior classes must receive cash or securities in the
reorganized corporation which amount to full satisfaction of their claims. 120
Accordingly, the rights of stockholders are commonly wiped out in chapter
X, and unsecured creditors usually receive less than full payment.
Once the plan is approved initially by the court, it is submitted to those
creditors and stockholders affected by it. 121 Then, it returns to the court for a
second examination. If the court is satisfied that the plan is fair, equitable and
feasible and the other requirements of the Act have been met, the court
confirms the plan. 122 The plan is then put into effect and the reorganized
corporation is sent back into the world to fend for itself. 
123
While this is the manner in which chapter X was intended to work, in
practice, chapter X reorganizations are often long, expensive, and cumber-
some proceedings. The success rate is relatively low and liquidation rather
than reorganization is the most common result. The mandatory dislocation of
management by a disinterested trustee makes it extremely unpopular with
those in control of the debtor and the considerable expense and delay in
payment makes it very unattractive to creditors. Nevertheless, chapter X is
the appropriate legal avenue to pursue where a large, public, corporate debtor
is involved which has a complex capital structure, problems with secured and
unsecured creditors and where there is a need for a disinterested inquiry into
the quality of management's performance.
124
118. Bankruptcy Act § 169, 11 U.S.C. § 569 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 10-301, 11 U.S.C.A.
app. R. 10-301 (1976).
119. Bankruptcy Act §§ 171-174, 11 U.S.C. §§ 571-574 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 10-303, 11
U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-303 (1976). Actually, the court could approve more than one plan which it
finds to be fair and equitable and feasible and leave it to affected creditors and stockholders to
choose between them.
120. See generally Bankruptcy Act § 174, 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1970); 6A COLLIER, supra note 14,
at 607-37.
121. Bankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 10-305, 11 U.S.C.A.
app. R. 10-305 (1976). The plan must be approved by two-thirds in amount of each creditor class
affected, and if the debtor is not insolvent, by a majority of the shares of stock.
122. Bankruptcy Act § 221, 11 U.S.C. §621 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 10-307, 11 U.S.C.A.
app. R. 10-307 (1976). See also Bankruptcy Act § 216, 11 U.S.C. § 616 (1970).
123. Bankruptcy Act §§ 228-229, II U.S.C. §§ 628-629 (1970); Bankruptcy Rules 10-306,
10-309, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-306, 10-309 (1976).
124. See, e.g., SEC v. American Trailer Rentals, 379 U.S. 594 (1965). See also Bankruptcy
Act § 328, 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 11-15, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 11-15 (Supp. IV
1974).
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The new Rules attempt to establish a procedural format for dealing with a
large, complex proceeding involving thousands of creditors and stockhol-
ders. In general, the Rules do quite well. Unfortunately, however, the
rulemakers endeavored to delete significantly some of the investor protection
provisions of chapter X.
The chapter X rules, like the straight bankruptcy rules, are divided into
nine parts. Part I deals with the initiation and assignment of the proceeding.' 25
Probably the most significant rule in this regard is rule 10-103 which permits
the entire case to be referred to a bankruptcy judge. 126 Formerly, under
section 117127 of chapter X, the case would be assigned to a district judge who
could refer to the referee (bankruptcy judge) only those parts of the proceed-
ing not reserved to the judge by chapter X. 128 The rule overrides this provision
and provides an affirmative presumption of sorts that the entire case is to be
heard by a bankruptcy judge. If either the local rule or the district judge to
whom it is assigned permits, the entire case (or part of a case) can be referred
to the bankruptcy judge. Since one can hardly imagine a district judge
voluntarily crowding his docket with such a time consuming proceeding, rule
10-103 should have the effect of transferring virtually all chapter X cases to
the bankruptcy court in order to avoid a bifurcated proceeding. It is submitted
that this is in the interests of all parties.
Part II of the rules governs appointment of the trustee, duties of the
trustee, intervention by parties, and compensation. 129 In all but the smallest
chapter X case, i.e., in any case where fixed liabilities are $250,000 or more,
a trustee must be appointed. 130 In chapter X, the trustee is not elected by the
creditors, as in straight bankruptcy,1 3 1 but instead is appointed by the court. 132
The Rules continue the requirement of sections 156 to 158 that the trustee be
"disinterested.- 1 33 However, the concept of "disinterested" trustee as
125. Bankruptcy Rules 10-101 to 10-118, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-101 to 10-118 (1976).
126. Bankruptcy Rule 10-103, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-103 (1976).
127. Bankruptcy Act § 117, 11 U.S.C. § 517 (1970).
128. When the Act says a matter shall be heard by a "judge" and not by "the court," only
a district judge can hear it. Compare Bankruptcy Act section 1(20) with section 1(9). For exam-
ples of such provisions in chapter X refer to Bankruptcy Act section 156 (appointment of a trus-
tee), section 174 (approval of a plan), section 221 (confirmation of a plan) and sections 241-249
(awarding of fees). Of course the referee could hear these matters as special master and make
recommendations to the judge. However, an inevitable result of section 117 was a bifurcated
proceeding unless the district judge kept the whole case. The resulting overlap was often time
consuming since this procedure proved to be little more than an idle ceremony wherein the
district judges would confirm the bankruptcy judges' reports in the capacity of a special master in
such matters normally reserved to the "judge."
129. Bankruptcy Rules 10-201 to 10-217, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-201 to 10-217 (1976).
130. Bankruptcy Rule 10-202, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-202 (1976).
131. See Bankruptcy Rule 209(a), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 209(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
132. Bankruptcy Rule 10-202, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-202 (1976). Whereas the power to
select a chapter X trustee was reserved to the district judge under section 156 (11 U.S.C. § 556
(1970)), this rule permits the "court," i.e., the bankruptcy judge, to make the appointment.
133. Bankruptcy Act §§ 156-158, 11 U.S.C. §§ 556-558 (1970). The provision for a second
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defined in section 158 of chapter X is weakened in one significant respect by
rule 10-202(c)(2)'s provision that: "[riepresentation of a creditor or a
stockholder of the debtor in a matter other than one which may become
involved in the chapter X case need not be deemed of itself to affect the
disinterestedness of an attorney." 134 The failure of the rulemakers to explain
why this exception was limited to attorneys raises the inference that since
lawyers wrote the rules, the bar attempted to merely take care of its own.
Since either an employee or the agent of a stockholder or creditor could also
serve equally well as trustee, it is submitted that if the standard of disinterest-
edness is to be eroded, then the exception should not be limited to lawyers. 135
In any case, this provision overrules the Seventh Circuit's decision in In
re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 136 thus, diluting the standards concerning
disinterested parties. It is hard to see how one who has a client who has a
significant interest in a case could be "disinterested" even if the representa-
tion of that client was confined to matters other than the chapter X case. If an
actual conflict of interest is not created by such a dual representation, then
certainly the appearance of a conflict is created. It is also hard to believe that a
competent attorney with no prior connection with any party in interest cannot
be found by the court after diligent inquiry to avoid the appearance of bias in
what is necessarily a difficult situation for creditors and stockholders.
One of the clearly identified defects of prior reorganization processes
additional trustee who is not disinterested, found in section 156, is not found in rule 10-202. Thus,
all trustees appointed in chapter X must be disinterested. Old management can no longer be
retained with the title of additional trustees although the trustee could retain old management to
assist him as employees of the debtor corporation in running the business without the title of
trustee. General counsel to the trustee must also be disinterested, although special counsel need
not be. Bankruptcy Rule 10-206(a), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-206(a) (1976). A rather Draconian
provision is contained in rule 10-206(b) which threatens a trustee with total forfeiture of
compensation if his general counsel is not in fact disinterested. The loss of compensation is
limited to the situation where counsel conceals the facts regarding his conflict and the trustee fails
to make diligent investigation into the lawyer's impermissible "connection." Since a chapter X
trustee usually becomes the full-time chief executive officer of a large corporate debtor and is
compensated accordingly, the amounts at risk could be substantial. How a layman could be
expected to discover an attorney's connection before employment is unclear. However, a
cautious trustee would make an inquiry in every case. Such inquiry would most likely be wasteful
and unproductive in almost every case. The same end, disclosure of conflicts, can be accom-
plished without unnecessary waste of the trustee's time and energy by requiring counsel to live up
to the ethical standards of the profession, under the gentle compulsion of the threatened loss of
counsel's compensation for failure to disclose as provided in rule 10-206. 11 U.S.C.A. app. R.
10-206 (1976). Threatening the trustee's compensation is a case of unnecessary overkill and may
discourage cautious but competent people from serving.
134. Bankruptcy Rule 10-202(c)(2), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-202(c)(2) (1976).
135. But see Meredith v. Thralls, 144 F.2d 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 758 (1944).
Under rule 10-202(c)(2), an attorney who was or is an employee of a stockholder or creditor would
not be barred from serving as trustee, although all other employees of the creditor or stockholder
would be so barred. 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-202(c)(2) (1976).
136. 93 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1937). This case was decided pursuant to former Bankruptcy Act §
77B, the predecessor to chapter X. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (current version
incorporated at I1 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-676 (1976)).
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was that court possessed the power to appoint trustees that were "sympathe-
tic" to management. 137 This enabled old management to control the proceed-
ings. Chapter X corrected this abuse and protected investors by insisting that
those in control of the proceeding, the trustee and his counsel, should be
totally disinterested. It seems strange and unjustified to now retreat from this
high standard. There is no evidence that it has been impossible to find
competent attorneys to serve as chapter X trustees who are free from all bias.
Part II of the chapter X rules retreats from the investor protection
provisions of the Act in another area. Section 249 of chapter X is meant to
protect investors from the evils of insider trading in the debtor's securities by
providing that any fidiciary or other representative (including committees or
attorneys) who buys or sells securities of the debtor after the fidiciary
relationship begins forfeits all compensation from the debtor estate.138 The
provision is absolute in its terms. The court has no power to rescue the
voluntary trader by prior or subsequent approval. The court's discretion is
limited solely to situations of involuntary transfer by, for example, devise.
Only in such cases can the court prevent application of the section 249 penalty
by sanctioning the transfer.
Section 249 was meant to be a broad prophylactic rule. Insiders who
traded knew they did so on automatic penalty of forfeiture of compensa-
tion. 139 There was no hope of trading and then obtaining a reprieve from a
lenient court. The rulemakers changed this in rule 10-215(c)(4) 140 to permit
the court to approve either before or after voluntary trading by insiders in the
debtor's securities. By doing so, the penalty of loss of compensation was
removed. This rule is likely to encourage insider trading in the debtor's
securities while further eroding the investor protections of chapter X. 141
As to the parties to the proceeding, rule 10-210 continues the democrati-
zation approach of chapter X by opening the proceedings to all interests. It
provides for intervention of right for management, all creditors, stockholders,
and indenture trustees. In addition, the investor protection role of the SEC as a
137. 6 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 1143-47.
138. Bankruptcy Act § 249, 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1970).
139. Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633 (1963).
140. Bankruptcy Rule 10-215(c)(4), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-215(c)(4) (1976).
141. Other than this, rules 10-215 and 10-216 generally make no changes in practice under
sections 241-249 with respect to applications for and allowance of compensation to those who are
entitled to compensation from the estate on account of services rendered during a chapter X case.
Rule 10-217 makes it clear that the power of the court to examine transactions between the debtor
and its attorney under section 60d (11 U.S.C. § 96(d) (1970)) and rule 10-220 applies in chapter X as
well. See also Bankruptcy Rule 10-215(b), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-215(b) (1976). The court can set
aside any attorneys' fees paid by the debtor in contemplation of bankruptcy and/or chapter X
which it deems unreasonable. Contemplation of bankruptcy includes payments made by the
debtor to a lawyer to avoid bankruptcy as, for example, in attempting to effect a common law
composition or exchange of securities. In re Carter Semiconductor, Inc., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
66, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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party to the proceedings and permissive intervention by unions on the
economic soundness of a plan is specifically provided for. The court is also
given virtually unlimited authority to allow any other interest to be heard on a
permissive basis. 142 In this regard, the rules make no change in the procedure
under the statute. 1
43
Part III of the chapter X rules contains the rules which relate to the
procedure involved in the proposal, approval, and confirmation of the
reorganization plan. Actually, the first step in the plan process is found in rule
10-208(a)(8) which requires the trustee to notify creditors and stockholders
that they may submit proposals for a plan to the trustee. 144 The trustee is then
given a period of time under rule 10-301 to file a plan or submit a report as to
why a plan cannot be formulated. 145 Only after the expiration of the time
afforded the trustee to act may the debtor, creditors and stockholders file their
own plan proposals with the court. 146 The court then holds a hearing on the
plan and submits such plans as it deems "worthy of consideration" to the
SEC for an SEC Advisory Report.147 Thereafter, a second (or continued)
hearing is held on the SEC's report. If additional evidence is generated at that
hearing, the plan or plans can be resubmitted to the SEC for a supplemental
report. 148 Thereafter, the court approves a plan and sends it out for a vote.
The Rules make no change in the substantive requirement that in order to
be approved a plan must be "fair and equitable and feasible." 149 In order to
ensure that all affected parties will make an intelligent decision on the plan,
142. Bankruptcy Rule 10-210, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-210 (1976).
143. Bankruptcy Act §§ 206-208, 11 U.S.C. §§ 606-608 (1970).
144. Bankruptcy Rule 10-208(a)(8), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-208(a)(8) (1976). Rule 10-208
tracks closely with section 167 (11 U.S.C. § 567 (1970)) and requires the trustee to make an
in-depth inquiry into and report with respect to the history, business, and affairs of the debtor.
This inquiry and report serves two functions: (1) to uncover any causes of action against those
who were responsible for the collapse; and (2) to provide information about the debtor's
prospects on which the formulation of a plan can be based. The inquiry and report appear to be,
and should be, mandatory.
145. Bankruptcy Rule 10-301, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-301 (1976).
146. Bankruptcy Rule 10-301(c), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-301(c) (1976). The draftsmen
perceived that this requirement that the trustee get the first bite at the plan represents no change
in present law and is an investor-protection device since it prevents "insiders" from acquiring
control of the proceeding and steamrolling a plan.
147. Bankruptcy Rule 10-303(b), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-303(b) (1976). If indebtedness is at
least $3,000,000, the reference to the SEC is mandatory; otherwise it is discretionary with the
court. This is in accord with present section 172. 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970). Here, the draftsmen
should have changed the prior procedure. The need for an SEC report turns not on the number of
dollars involved but on the number of investors involved. Since the SEC generally participates
only in those chapter X proceedings in which public investors are involved, the draftsmen should
have made plain reference mandatory in all cases where the SEC was a party and discretionary in
all other cases.
148. Bankruptcy Rule 10-303(c), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-303(c) (1976). Again this codifies
present, albeit non-statutory, practice.
149. Bankruptcy Act § 174, 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1970). In order to be approved, the plan must
also satisfy the rather detailed requirements of section 216. 11 U.S.C. § 616 (1970).
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the Rules provide the voter with summaries of the plan, the SEC report and the
court's opinion approving the plan. The voter may, if the court so orders,
receive a full text of any or all of the foregoing documents in addition to or in
lieu of a summary.
This represents a change from a prior law which required transmission
of the full plan. 150 Since the plan would rarely be comprehensible to a public
investor, the transmission of a clear summary appears to make sense both
from the point of view of facilitating an intelligent decision making process
and as a matter of economy. The Rules continue the prohibition on solicitation
of votes by any person, including the trustee, prior to the approval of the
plan. 151 By appropriate reference to "other law," however, the Rules should
make it clear that such solicitations are in appropriate cases subject to other
proxy solicitation rules such as bankruptcy rule 208 and section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.152
Probably the most significant change in the plan process is found in the
area of voting by creditors and stockholders. Under section 179,153 a plan
must be approved by two thirds in amount of each class of creditors. If the
debtor is not insolvent, the plan must also be approved by a majority of shares
of each class of stock. 154 The requisite majorities were computed with respect
to the stockholder's claims proved and allowed. Thus, if a creditor or
stockholder, whose claim had been proved and allowed, failed to vote, the
abstention was counted as a "no" vote.
Under rule 10-401, it is no longer necessary for most creditors and
stockholders to file proofs of claim. 155 Accordingly, rule 10-305156 computes
only the votes of those who actually vote on the plan instead of basing the
computation of acceptances and rejections on the proofs of claim. An
abstention is of no force or effect. 157 Thus, it should be easier to obtain the
150. Bankruptcy Act § 175(a), 11 U.S.C. § 575(a) (1970). Compare Rule 10-303(e), 11
U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-303(e) (1976).
151. Bankruptcy Act § 176, 11 U.S.C. § 576 (1970); Bankruptcy Rules 10-303(c), 10-304, 11
U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-303(c), 10-304 (1976). The statute only prohibited the solicitation of
acceptances. The rule prohibits the solicitation of either affirmative or negative votes.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970). See also Rule 10-211(b), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-21 l(b) (1976).
153. Bankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1970).
154. If the corporation is insolvent, the stockholders can receive nothing under the plan
pursuant to the absolute priority rule and thus, since they have no interest in the business, they
are not affected and do not vote. Bankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1970).
155. Only creditors with disputed, contingent, or unliquidated claims and creditors and
stockholders whose claims are not listed on the debtor's records need file a proof of claim.
Bankruptcy Rule 10-401, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-401 (1976).
156. Bankruptcy Rule 10-305, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-305 (1976).
157: See also Bankruptcy Form No. 10-7, I1 U.S.C.A. app. Form No. 10-7 (1976). Actually
it is not precisely accurate that an absention would always be of no force and effect. Rule
10-305(e) provides that the amount of creditors' claims and shares approving the plan shall "in no
event be less than the requisite majorities of the filed and allowed claims and stock interests." 11
U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-305(e) (1976). Under rule 10-401, an indenture trustee may file a proof of
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acceptances required for the adoption of a plan of reorganization.158
After the plan has been approved by the court and by those creditors and
stockholders affected by it, it returns to the court for a second review (in fact,
a third hearing) leading to the final step in the adoption of a plan of
reorganization-which is confirmation. The approval of a plan does not affect
the right of parties in interest to object to confirmation. 159 And the issues
involved in confirmation are a good deal broader than those involved in
approval by the court. In considering whether to confirm the plan, the court
not only considers again whether the plan is fair and equitable and feasible,
but, if the plan is one of reorganization as opposed to liquidation, the court
must satisfy itself as to the suitability of those who are to manage the business.
In any case, the court must be satisfied as to the bona fides of those proposing
the plan and the manner in which acceptances were obtained.'60
The Rules make no significant change in the statutory requirements in
connection with confirmation. The only really significant provision in the
Rules with respect to confirmation is the requirement that objections to the
confirmation of a plan be filed at least ten days before the hearing on
confirmation. 161 The Rules also provide "if more than one plan has received
the requisite number of acceptances, the court shall consider the preferences
indicated by the creditors and stockholders. in determining which plan to
confirm.' ' 162 This statement is close to a legal nullity. It does not limit the
court's discretion to approve the plan which is less preferred by those
affected. Notably, the text of this rule states what "ought" to be, not what
"must" be. Thus, the rule should be changed to require the court to comply
claim for the entire class for which it is trustee. 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-401 (1976). However, an
indenture trustee is not a creditor for voting purposes. Individual investors whom it represents
retain the right to vote themselves. Thus, the rules failed to carry over or change section 198 to the
effect that when an indenture trustee files a claim for a group of public investor creditors, only
actual votes count in the computation of the requisite majorities. 11 U.S.C. § 498 (1970). As a
result, it may be argued that the plan must be accepted by two-thirds of the amount of
bondholders or debenture holders, not just two-thirds of those voting. This argument assumes
that the debenture or bondholders are a separate class of creditors. Abstention by such a creditor
would be a "no" vote.
In the case of bearer-debt securities, this could be a serious problem. It might be avoided by
either the indenture trustee declining to file a proof of claim or by a change in the rules. Since the
rules do not require an indenture trustee to file a proof of claim, but merely permit it, and since the
claims of debenture or bondholders are presumably not the type for which a claim must be filed
under rule 10-401, it would be best for an indenture trustee not to undertake the useless task'of
filing the proof of claim. Failure to file affects no rights, including the indenture trustee's absolute
right to be heard. See Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(a)(1), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-210(a)(l) (1976).
158. It should be remembered, however, that chapter X has "cramdown" provisions for
forcing a plan on an unwilling class of creditors and stockholders. Bankruptcy Act §§ 216(7)-(8),
11 U.S.C. §§ 616(7)-(8) (1970). These provisions are not affected by the rules.
159. Bankruptcy Rule 10-303(h), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-303(h) (1976).
160. Bankruptcy Act § 221, 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1970). If the United States is a creditor, the court
must satisfy itself that the requirements of section 199 are met. II U.S.C. § 599 (1970).
161. Bankruptcy Rule 10-307(a)(1), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-307(a)(1) (1976).
162. Bankruptcy Rule 10-307(a)(2), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-307(a)(2) (1976).
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with the expressed preference of those with a stake in the reorganization so
long as the preferred plan meets all of the other requirements of the statute.
After confirmation, the final step in the reorganization process is the
execution or consummation of the plan. Consummation of the plan discharges
the debtor from the unpaid balance of its debts and finally alters the interests
of the stockholders. 163
Probably the most important step in the consummation process is the
point at which a plan is deemed "substantially consummated." At any time
after a plan is approved up until the time the plan is substantially consum-
mated, the plan can be modified. If the modification adversely affects the
interests of creditors and stockholders, it must be approved by the requisite
majority. 164 There is a limit, however, to the extent to which the plan may be
changed. After a plan is substantially consummated, a modification which
materially and adversely affects the interests of creditors or stockholders
cannot be confirmed by the court even if approved by the requisite majority of
the affected class. 165 Substantial confirmation occurs under rule 10-306(c) 1"
when all of the property to be dealt with by the plan has been substantially
transferred, the designated operators of the reorganized corporation have
taken control and commenced operation of the business, and distribution to
creditors and stockholders has begun.
Part III of the Rules also contemplate the procedure to be followed in the
event the reorganization effort fails. In such cases, the court is given similar,
but somewhat broader, discretion than under the statute to continue the
reorganization effort. 167 Alternatively, the court can, upon failure to propose,
approve, confirm, or consummate a plan, dismiss the chapter X, convert it in
appropriate cases to straight bankruptcy or, under a newly added provision,
convert the case to chapter XI with the consent of the debtor. 168
163. Bankruptcy Act § 228, 11 U.S.C. § 628 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 10-307, 11 U.S.C.A.
app. R. 10-307 (1976).
164. Bankruptcy Act §§ 222-223, 11 U.S.C. §§ 622-623 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 10-306(b), 11
U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-306(b) (1976). "Materially" and "adversely affected" is defined by section
107. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1970). One difference in voting on a modification of an approved or
confirmed plan and voting to approve a claim is that while an abstention is of no force with respect
to voting on the plan under rule 10-305, with respect to a modification, an abstention is a "yes"
vote since failure to reject is deemed an acceptance. 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-305, 10-306(b)
(1976).
165. 6A COLLIER, supra note 14, at 722-24. A cosmetic amendment which does not
materially or adversely affect any class can be implemented even after substantial confirmation.
Presumably, an amendment which does materially and adversely affect a class of creditors or
stockholders could be confirmed even after substantial consummation of the plan if no one
objected. However, the amendment could not be confirmed if a single member of the affected
class objected.
166. Bankruptcy Rule 10-306(c), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-306(c) (1976).
167. Compare Bankruptcy Rule 10-308, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-308(1976) with Bankruptcy
Act §§ 236-238, 11 U.S.C. §§ 636-638 (1970).
168. The consent of the debtor is necessary because chapter XI is strictly a voluntary
proceeding. Bankruptcy Act §§ 321-322, 11 U.S.C. §§ 721-722 (1970). Considering the alternatives
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Conversions to straight bankruptcy should result only in extreme cases.
In most cases, if reorganization proves impossible, the court should exercise
the discretion given it to continue the chapter X case and direct the trustee to
prepare a plan of orderly liquidation. 169 A plan of orderly liquidation is
preferable to straight bankruptcy by preserving such going concern values as
might exist for creditors, and by permitting negotiated sales of assets which
will generate more for creditors than auction block, straight bankruptcy
liquidation. In addition, the orderly liquidation approach avoids the unneces-
sary duplication of expenses of administration occasioned by the election of a
straight bankruptcy trustee to succeed the chapter X trustee to carry out the
liquidation.
Part IV of the chapter X rules relates to the claims of creditors and
stockholders. The most significant provision of this is rule 10-401, which
does away with the formal requirement of proof of allowance of claims in
most cases. 170 Unless the claim of a creditor is disputed, unliquidated,
contingent, or unscheduled, or the claim of a stockholder is somehow
disputed or not of record, the creditor or stockholder does not need to file a
proof of claim. Therefore, in most situations, the schedules and lists will
control and few, if any, creditors or stockholders will have to file proofs of
claim. This should reduce a high volume of useless paperwork.
One other rule practitioners should be aware of in Part IV is rule 10-404
which governs the right of a creditor to withdraw a claim. 171 Once a creditor
has participated significantly in a chapter X case, the creditor loses the right to
withdraw. In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Katchen
v. Landy, 172 a creditor should carefully measure his exposure to the trustee's
avoiding powers before significantly participating in a chapter X proceeding,
e.g. , by voting on a plan or accepting a distribution under a plan. Otherwise,
such a creditor might find himself submitting to the bankruptcy court's
summary jurisdiction and be liable to the trustee not just for a setoff but for an
affirmative judgment. A creditor client is hardly going to be elated with such a
result.
Part V of the chapter X rules, dealing with the role of bankruptcy judges
simply adopts Part V of the straight bankruptcy rules. 173 Part VI of the chapter
facing the debtor on failure of the chapter X, such consent should be a mere formality. The only
reference to conversion in chapter XI is found in section 147 which contemplates a transfer at the
outset, not after the failure of the chapter X. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1970). See also Bankruptcy Act §
146(2), l lU.S.C. § 546(2) (1970) and Bankruptcy Rule 10-117, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-117 (1976).
169. Bankruptcy Act § 216(10) permits such a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 616(10) (1970).
170. Bankruptcy Rule 10-401, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-401 (1976).
171. Bankruptcy Rule 10-404, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-404 (1976).
172. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
173. See Bankruptcy Rule 10-103 which in effect transfers chapter X cases from district
judges to bankruptcy judges. 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-103 (1976). See text accompanying note 125
supra.
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X rules tracks closely with Part VI of the straight bankruptcy rules. It contains
numerous provisions with respect to the administration of the estate outside of
the plan. Most notable here is rule 10-601 which provides that the filing of a
petition operates as an automatic stay of the commencement or continuation
of any proceeding against the debtor.' 74 Any creditor wishing to proceed
against the debtor or its property in a non-bankruptcy court must first seek the
permission of the bankruptcy court. Since chapter X empowers the bankrupt-
cy court to deal with the claims of secured creditors, unsecured creditors and
stockholders, it would seem unlikely that the creditor would be allowed to
proceed outside of chapter X. The stay is automatic and applies to
everything from foreclosure or enforcement of any consensual, statutory, or
judicial lien to arbitration.
Parts VII and VIII of the chapter X rules generally incorporate the
straight bankruptcy rules dealing with adversary proceedings and appeals to
the district court. "I Part IX of the chapter X rules incorporates Part IX of the
straight bankruptcy rules with some minor changes.
Chapter XII Rules
The chapter XII rules are not organized like the chapter X or straight
bankruptcy rules. Instead, they are set up in a pattern similar to that of the
chapter XI rules. There are sixty-two chapter XII rules, not broken out into
organized parts, covering a variety of different subjects. The order of the
rules, ranging from the petition, through the selection of a trustee and
compensation to the parties, to the plan process and to matters of adminis-
tration outside of the plan, is similar to, although not precisely the same as,
the order of the straight bankruptcy, chapter X and chapter XI rules.
Chapter XII of the Act provides relief for unincorporated entities which
own interests in real property and have difficulties with creditors secured by
those real property interests. 176 Corporations are specifically excluded from
chapter XII. 177 The proceeding is strictly voluntary and can be initiated by the
debtor either on an original petition or in a pending bankruptcy proceeding
before or after adjudication. 178 The filing of a chapter XII petition stays any
straight bankruptcy proceeding involving the debtor 179 as well as the com-
174. Bankruptcy Rule 10-601, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-601 (1976).
175. Although section 208 and Rule 10-210(c) limit the appellate rights of the SEC, that
limitation applies only to appeals from the district court to the court of appeals. Bankruptcy Act §
208, 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(c), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-210(c) (1976).
Thus, the SEC may appeal from the bankruptcy judge to the district court.
176. Bankruptcy Act § 406(1), 11 U.S.C. § 806(1) (1970).
177. Bankruptcy Act § 406(6), 11 U.S.C. § 806(6) (1970).
178. Bankruptcy Rules 12-6, 12-7, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-6, 12-7 (1976).
179. Bankruptcy Rule 12-7, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-7 (1976); cf. Bankruptcy Act § 425, 11
U.S.C. § 825 (1970).
BANKRUPTCY
mencement or continuation of any other proceeding against the debtor. 180
The chapter XII case is automatically referred to a bankruptcy judge who
handles the entire proceeding. 181 If the chapter XII case is by original petition,
or in a pending bankruptcy before a trustee has been elected and qualified, the
court may, on motion by any party for cause shown, appoint a trustee, or it
may leave the debtor in possession.'8 2 If a straight bankruptcy trustee has
qualified at the time of the chapter XII petition, that person must be appointed
chapter XII trustee. 183 Receivers are rarely, if ever, appointed under chapter
XII. 18
4
As with any other reorganization proceeding, the heart of chapter XII is
the plan. The purpose of chapter XII is to save the debtor's assets by financial
rehabilitation, not liquidation. The plan may be proposed by the debtor with
the petition or thereafter. 185 Also, a plan may be proposed by a secured
creditor who has a security interest in realty and is affected by the plan. An
unsecured creditor cannot propose a plan. 186 While the plan of arrangement
must contain certain provisions under section 461,187 basically a plan must
affect creditors secured by realty and may contain provisions affecting
unsecured creditors as well.
Since 1952, chapter XII has not contained a requirement that the plan be
fair and equitable. For this reason the chapter XII plan is not subject to the
absolute priority rule. 188 The plan must be in the best interests of creditors and
feasible. 189 This simply means that the creditors must receive more under the
180. Bankruptcy Rule 12-43, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-43 (1976). See also Bankruptcy Act §§
414, 427, 428, 507, 11 U.S.C. §§ 814, 827, 828, 907 (1970).
181. Bankruptcy Rule 12-5, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-5 (1976). The reference was formerly
discretionary with the district judge.
182. Bankruptcy Rule 12-17(b), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-17(b) (1976). A debtor in possession
has the avoiding and other powers of a bankruptcy trustee. Bankruptcy Act § 444, 11 U.S.C. § 844
(1970). See also Rule 12-22 regarding the operation of the business by a debtor in possession. 11
U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-22 (1976).
183. Bankruptcy Rule 12-17(a), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-17(a) (1976).
184. Although there is no authority by statute to appoint a receiver in chapter XII, there is
some support for the notion that the court has the power to do so under section 2a(3). 11 U.S.C. §
I l(a)(3) (1970). See 9 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 905-07. See also Advisory Committee Note to
Bankruptcy Rule 12-17, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-17 (1976).
185. Bankruptcy Rule 12-36(a), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-36(a) (1976). This contrasts with
section 423 which required the plan to be filed with the petition. 11 U.S.C. §823 (1970). The rules
continue the requirement of section 423 that schedules, statements of affairs, and a statement of
executory contracts accompany or immediately follow the petition. Bankruptcy Rule 12-11, 11
U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-11 (1976).
186. Bankruptcy Rule 12-36(b), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-36(b) (1976). Unlike section 466 (11
U.S.C. § 866 (1970)), the rule does not require the creditor proposing the plan to have the backing
of some given percentage of creditors.
187. Bankruptcy Act § 461, 11 U.S.C. § 861 (1970).
188. 9 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 1141-44. See also Bankruptcy Act § 472, 11 U.S.C. § 872
(1970). The plan may, however, take the absolute priority approach and exclude the debtor from
retaining any interest in the property dealt with in the plan if the debtor has no equity in his
property. In re Hamburger, 117 F.2d 932 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 572 (1941).
189, Bankruptcy Act § 472(2), 11 U.S.C. § 868 (1970).
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chapter XII plan than they would in liquidation' 90 and that the debtor will be
able to make the payments required by the plan. 191
The plan must then be approved by two thirds in amount of each class
affected by it. 192 Only votes for or against the plan are counted in determining
the vote. An abstention has no effect. 93 Once the plan is approved by the
creditors, the debtor makes a deposit of cash to cover the costs of the
proceeding and any initial cash distribution under the plan. 194
If the court is satisfied that the plan meets the requirements of the
statute, 195 that it has been proposed and accepted by the creditors in good
faith, and that the plan is in the best interests of creditors and feasible, the
court then confirms the plan.196 If there is no objection to confirmation, the
court may confirm the plan on the record without taking additional evi-
dence. 197 If more than one plan has received the requisite creditor approval,
the court chooses between the accepted plans. The court is to consider, but is
not bound by, the weight of the creditor acceptances choosing which plan to
confirm. 98 The confirmation of the plan operates as a discharge of the debtor
from all dischargeable obligations provided for in the plan. 199
If no plan is proposed or confirmed, the court may dismiss the case or
adjudicate the debtor a bankrupt. If a creditor has filed a plan, the debtor
cannot, as of right, have the case converted to straight bankruptcy; otherwise,
the debtor has a right to insist on conversion to straight bankruptcy under any
190. Meyer v. Bowen, 195 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1952).
191. 9 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 1139-40. See Bankruptcy Form 12-F18, 11 U.S.C.A. app.
Form 12-F18 (1976).
192. Bankruptcy Act § 468, 11 U.S.C. § 868 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 12-37(d), 11 U.S.C.A.
app. R. 12-37(d) (1976). Only the amount of the claims in a class is considered. The number of
creditors in the class is irrelevant.
193. Actually, the way rule 12-37(d) is worded, if a creditor files a proof of claim and then
abstains, the abstention would amount to a rejection. 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-37(d) (1976).
However, since rule 12-30 generally does away with the need to file a proof of claim in a chapter
XII proceeding (11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-30 (1976)), the language of rule 12-37(d) should not be of
significance.
194. Bankruptcy Act § 437(2), 11 U.S.C. § 837(2) (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 12-38, I1
U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-38 (1976). If the plan is proposed by a creditor or group of creditors, the
deposit may be required of the creditor. 9 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 932-33. A disbursing agent
may be appointed to receive the deposit. Bankruptcy Rule 12-38(a), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-38(a)
(1976). If a trustee is appointed, the trustee must be appointed as disbursing agent. Thus, a
disbursing agent is only used, if at all, when the debtor is in possession.
195. Section 461 of the Bankruptcy Act contains a rather elaborate list of requirements. 11
U.S.C. § 861 (1970).
196. Bankruptcy Act § 472, 11 U.S.C. § 872 (1970).
197. Bankruptcy Rule 12-38(d), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-38(d) (1976).
198. Id.
199. Bankruptcy Act § 476, 11 U.S.C. § 876 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 12-42, 11 U.S.C.A. app.
R. 12-42 (1976). Section 17 applies in chapter XII. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970). However, the provisions
of section 17c(2) requiring the court to fix a time for filing section 17a(2), (4) or (8) objections are
not mandatory but are merely permissive in chapter XII. Bankruptcy Rule 12-47, 11 U.S.C.A.
app. R. 12-47 (1976). See generally, 9 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 1164-72.
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circumstance. 2" Also, the rules permit optional adjudication or dismissal by
the court sua sponte or at a creditor's request at any time prior to or after the
confirmation of a plan under appropriate circumstances.
Finally, rule 12-28 provides for awards of compensation to be made by
the court from the estate to the various parties in interest, their attorneys, and
accountants. 20 The rule follows the general approach in the other chapters,
such as chapter X, to encourage democratization of the reorganization process
by taking a generous approach to the question of who may receive compensa-
tion for services rendered in the rehabilitation effort.20 2 The court has the
power to control the allowance process by examining transactions between
the debtor and its attorney. Thus, the court may disallow any unreasonable
amount of compensation paid by the debtor to an attorney in contemplation of
and during bankruptcy.20 3 The court can also deny awards of compensation to
anyone acting in a representative or fiduciary capacity who at any time after
begining to act in such capacity has traded in claims against the debtor.204
In light of the rapidly increasing popularity of chapter XII proceed-
ings, 205 the chapter XII rules should make this previously overlooked chapter
of the Bankruptcy Act more readily comprehensible to practitioners. Chapter
XII is an attractive vehicle for an individual or unincorporated debtor who has
trouble with creditors secured by realty, usually the most difficult class of
creditors to be dealt with by a debtor. The Rules provide a simple, efficient
procedure for such cases and should make counsel more willing to turn to
chapter XII in appropriate cases.
CASE DEVELOPMENTS
United States Supreme Court
There have also been some significant developments in the area of
bankruptcy case law. Late in the 1974-75 term, the United States Supreme
Court considered and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Phelps v. United States.2°6 The case involved a dispute
200. Bankruptcy Rule 12-41, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-41(1976). This apparently is a change in
prior law under sections 481-482. 11 U.S.C. §§ 881-882 (1970). Remember that chapter XII is
strictly voluntary. A debtor can, however, be adjudicated without his consent, unless he is a
farmer or a wage earner, as defined in Bankruptcy Act § 1(32), 11 U.S.C. § 1(32) (1970);
Bankruptcy Rule 12-41(e), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-41(e) (1976).
201. Bankruptcy Rule 12-28, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-28 (1976).
202. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 241-243, 11 U.S.C. §§ 641-643 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 10-215,
11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 10-215 (1976).
203. Bankruptcy Rule 12-29, 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-29 (1976).
204. Bankruptcy Rule 12-28(d), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R. 12-28(d) (1976). See also Bankruptcy
Act § 249, 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1970) and Bankruptcy Rule 10-215(c)(4), 11 U.S.C.A. app. R.
10-215(c)(4) (1976).
205. Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1976, at 48, col. 1.
206. 421 U.S. 330 (1975).
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between a bankruptcy receiver and the Internal Revenue Service over the right
to possession of the proceeds of the bankrupt's assets. In between March and
June of 1971, the government had assessed some $140,000 in taxes against
the debtor, Chicagoland Ideel Cleaners, Inc. Instead of paying the taxes, the
debtor made an assignment for the benefit of creditors in late June 1971. The
assignee liquidated the assets for $38,000 and, in August 1971, the govern-
ment filed a notice of tax lien against the debtor and served a notice of levy on
the assignee. In September 1971, an involuntary bankruptcy petition was
filed against the debtor and it was adjudicated a bankrupt. Phelps was
appointed receiver and demanded that the assignee turn over the $38,000 to
the bankruptcy court for its administration and distribution. The government
challenged the turnover petition, claiming it was entitled to possession of the
money by virtue of its pre-bankruptcy notice of levy on the assignee.2 °7 The
bankruptcy judge and district court held for the receiver. The Seventh Circuit
reversed and held that the government was entitled to the $38,000.208 Since
the Ninth Circuit had held that the bankruptcy trustee, not the government,
was entitled to the fund under similar circumstances, 2 9 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.21
Phelps presented several questions concerning the law surrounding
assignments for the benefit of creditors, federal taxes, and bankruptcy.
Before considering the Supreme Court's opinion, however, the following
concepts concerning bankruptcy assignments for the benefit of creditors
should be noted.
In an assignment for the benefit of creditors, a debtor makes a complete
transfer of all right, title and interest in all of his non-exempt property to a
third party who is to liquidate the property and distribute the proceeds to the
transferor's creditors. The transferee, the assignee for the benefit of creditors,
takes only such interest in the debtor's property as the debtor had. Thus, if the
debtor had subjected the property to security interests or liens, the assignee
takes the property subject to those liens. 211 Normally, the assignment cuts off
the opportunity of the debtor's unsecured creditors to obtain security interests
and liens in the debtor's property. 21 2 For example, if a creditor obtains a
judgment against the debtor and executes against the debtor's property after
the debtor has made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, the execution
will not serve to give the judgment creditor a lien in the property of the debtor
207. The assignee was a neutral party, not caring whether the government or Phelps got the
money.
208. United States v. Phelps (In re Chicagoland Ideel Cleaners, Inc.), 495 F.2d 1283 (1974),
aff'd, 421 U.S. 330 (1975).
209. Clements v. IRS (In re United General Wood Prods. Corp.), 483 F.2d 975 (1973).
210. 419 U.S. 1068 (1974).
211. Friedman v. First Nat'l Bank, 344 Mass. 593, 183 N.E.2d 722 (1962).
212. Brashear v. West, 32 U.S. (2 Peters) 607 (1833).
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in the hands of the assignee.213 However, when a debtor makes an assignment
and then is adjudicated a bankrupt, ordinarily the assignee must yield to the
bankruptcy trustee.2 14 Further, a bankruptcy court has summary jurisdiction
to compel the assignee to turn the property over to the bankruptcy trustee. 215
This concept is a traditional one in bankruptcy law. The bankruptcy
court has summary jurisdiction over all disputes surrounding claims against
property which is in the actual possession of the debtor at the time of the
petition. If the property in question is in the hands of a third party who asserts
a bona fide adverse claim against that property, disputes respecting the
debtor's title to or claims against that property must be resolved in plenary
proceedings. However, even if a third party is in possession of the debtor's
property at bankruptcy, the debtor will be deemed to be in constructive
possession of property and, thus, summary jurisdiction will exist, where: (1)
the third party is merely "the bankrupt's agent or bailee; (2) the property is
held by some other person who makes no claim to it; and (3) the property is
held by one who makes a claim, but the claim is colorable only." 216
The assignee in Phelps had been in possession for less than four months
and had made no claim to the property in its possession. Here, the assignee
was a mere naked legal title holder for the benefit of creditors. For these
reasons, the ordinary rule of section 2a(2 1)217 and application of traditional
bankruptcy doctrine would seem to be applicable and to require the assignee
to hand the money in his possession over to the bankruptcy court for its
summary jurisdiction and administration.
This was a result the government desperately wanted to avoid, however.
Although its federal tax lien was properly perfected against bona fide
purchasers and, thus, was good against the bankruptcy trustee under sections
67b and 67c of the Act, 211 the government feared a relatively obscure
provision of the Act, section 67c(3). This section provides that only in the
situation of a tax lien on personalty not reduced to possession, the tax lien (a
secured claim) is subordinated to the costs of administering the estate and the
213. Reed v. McIntyre, 98 U.S. 507, 513 (1878). See also U.C.C. § 9-301.
214. Bankruptcy Act §§ 2a(21), 70a(8), 11 U.S.C. §§ I l(a)(21), 11 0(a)(8) (1970). Section 2a(2 1)
operates only if bankruptcy follows within four months of the assignment.
215. Bankruptcy Act § 2a(21), 11 U.S.C. § 1l(a)(21) (1970). "Summary jurisdiction" refers
to the bankruptcy courts' exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters. "Plenary jurisdiction" on
the other hand refers to disputes arising in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding which must be
litigated in non-bankruptcy courts unless the defendant voluntarily allows the litigation to
proceed in the bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy Act §§ 2a(7), 23, 1I U.S.C. §§ I l(a), 46 (1970). See
generally Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
216. Taubei-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 433 (1924).
217. Bankruptcy Act § 2a(21), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(21) (1970.
218. Bankruptcy Act § 67, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1970). This was true because the government had
filed a notice levy and served a demand on the assignee for the proceeds. I.R.C. § 6331. See also
United States v. Pittman, 449 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1971).
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pre-bankruptcy wage claims entitled to priority under sections 64a (1) and
(2)219 of the statute (unsecured claims). Here the IRS had a tax lien on
personalty which it had not reduced to possession.
This is an alteration of the normal rule in bankruptcy that all valid
secured claims come ahead of all unsecured claims 220 and that section 64
merely affects the order of distribution among unsecured creditors after all
valid security interests have been satisfied. However, section 67c(3) con-
templates the situation where the tax lien is not reduced to possession and
where the debtor has actual or constructive possession of the property. In
other words, 67c(3) applies only if the personalty subject to the tax lien is also
subject to the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction. This is what the battle
in Phelps was all about.
The government argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that as a result
of the federal tax lien law, as opposed to bankruptcy law, the property did not
pass to the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction. The reasoning behind
this argument is that when the government assessed taxes and demanded
payment from the debtor before the assignment, it obtained an unfiled tax lien
against the debtor's assets. 221
While the unfiled tax lien could be cut off by a transfer to a bona fide
purchaser, or by various subsequent lien creditors, it was not cut off by
transfer to an assignee for the benefit of creditors.222 Therefore, the assignee
took the debtor's property subject to the unfiled tax lien. 223 Subsequently, the
government served a notice of levy and demand 224 on the assignee. As the
Supreme Court viewed it, the effect of the notice of demand was tantamount
to constructive seizure and subsequently the assignee held the property on
behalf of the government, not for the benefit of the debtor or its other
creditors. Thus, at bankruptcy, the property was held by neither the debtor nor
the one holding on the debtor's behalf. It was held by a third party, the
assignee, who was holding on behalf of a claimant with a substantial adverse
clain, the government. Where property is held by one asserting a real adverse
claim, the property and disputes surrounding it do not pass to the bankruptcy
court's summary jurisdiction for administration and, therefore, the subordi-
nation rule of section 67c(3) does not apply.
The Phelps decision seems to conflict with some basic bankruptcy
notions. The general rule is that a secured creditor (whether the security
219. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
220. Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515 (1943).
221. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6322.
222. I.R.C. § 6323.
223. The transfer by the assignee to a bona fide purchaser cut off the lien in the assets by the
debtor. However, the tax lien was not lost. It merely shifted to the proceeds in the assignee's
hands. See Loeber v. Leininger, 175 Ill. 484, 51 N.E. 703 (1898).
224. See I.R.C. § 6331.
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interest arises by consent, operation of law, or legal proceedings) must have
done everything possible to perfect and protect his security interest for
bankruptcy. 225 It is true that for public policy reasons an exception to this rule
has been carved out to protect certain statutory lienors who have been less
than diligent in perfecting their liens before bankruptcy.226 However, in
section 67c(3), Congress required a higher degree of diligence of governmen-
tal statutory lienors than of other statutory lienors. After all, the government
can be presumed to be far more capable of protecting its financial interests
vis-a-vis its debtors than an auto mechanic, for example. Therefore, Congress
stated a rather clear rule of public policy in section 67c(3). Unless the
government was diligent in reducing its tax lien on personalty to possession
before bankruptcy, then two other interests entitled to protection on public
policy grounds (the costs of administration and the priority wage claims of the
debtor's employees) would be promoted ahead of the less than perfect tax
lien.
In Phelps, the government had been less than diligent. Had the debtor
remained in possession of its assets during the assessment, demand and filing
of the notice of tax lien, and then had been adjudicated a bankrupt without
actual levy by the government, it is clear that section 67c(3) would have been
applicable. Further, under section 70a(8), assignees for the benefit of
creditors are denominated "agents for the bankrupt," 227 so the result should
be the same whether or not the debtor has made an assignment for the benefit
of creditors.
However, the Supreme Court found the crucial point to be that the
government had served a notice of levy on the assignee under section 6331 of
the Internal Revenue Code228 even though it admitted that it had not yet
seized. Under the Treasury Regulations, "levy", i.e., seizure, includes
service of a notice of levy. 229 Regardless of whether the Treasury Depart-
ment's broad redefinition of this statutory requirement was legitimate,
suppose that instead of making an assignment, the debtor remained in control
of the assets, that the government served a notice of levy on the debtor and that
before actual seizure could be effected by the government, the debtor filed a
bankruptcy. Clearly the rule of section 67c(3) would apply in such circum-
stances. It can be inferred that the result would not change when the notice is
225. See generally Bankruptcy Act §§ 70c, 70e, 11 U.S.C. §§ 110c, 110e(1970). Sometimes,
even if a diligent creditor does everything possible to obtain, perfect, and protect a security
interest or lien before bankruptcy, the perfected security interest is nevertheless subject to defeat
by the trustee's avoiding powers. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67a, 67c(1)(A), 67c(l)(C), 11
U.S.C. §§ 96, 107(a), 107(c)(l)(A), 107(c)(1)(C) (1970).
226. See Bankruptcy Act § 67c(1)(B), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(l)(B) (1970).
227. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(8), 11 U.S.C. § 10(a)(8) (1970).
228. I.R.C. § 6331.
229. 26 C.F.R. 301.6331-1(a)(1) (1976).
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served on a party deemed an agent of the debtor but actual seizure is not
effected.230
In Phelps, the Supreme Court glossed over the implication of section
70a(8) in a footnote. Since sections 70a(8) and 67c(3) are federal statutes, it
hardly appears appropriate that the policy implications embodied therein
should be altered by a federal agency's own regulations which serve to relax
and forgive an obligation of diligence which Congress has seen fit to impose
on the tax collector. 231
Seventh Circuit Cases
Several recent decisions handed down by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit are worth noting. In re Browy232 involved a dispute between a
trustee and an attorney who had represented the bankrupts prior to the
bankruptcy. The attorney had possession of certain records of the bankrupts
which the trustee wanted. The trustee brought a turnover proceeding and the
attorney, who had not yet been paid his pre-bankruptcy fees, responded by
asserting an attorney's lien on the records in his possession. The bankruptcy
judge then dismissed the trustee's turnover petition.
Failing to succeed in the turnover proceeding, the trustee persevered. He
next pursued an order requiring the attorney to appear for examination under
rule 205.233 Upon doing so, the trustee also served a subpoena duces tecum on
the attorney requiring him to bring the same records of the bankrupts in which
he asserted an attorney's lien to the examination. The bankruptcy judge
refused to quash the subpoena and the district judge affirmed. 234 On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit reversed.
The case is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it apparently marks the
first time that the Seventh Circuit has considered the question of the validity of
an attorney's lien in bankruptcy. The case arose in Illinois where attorneys, by
following a notice procedure, can obtain a statutory lien for their fees on funds
230. The inference could arguably be the contrary in light of section 6332 of the Internal
Revenue Code which would make any person holding property levied on by the government who
fails to surrender it, personally liable for the tax. I.R.C. § 6332. However, suppose the taxpayer
filed bankruptcy before the government seized the bankrupt taxpayer's property which was in
the hands of a third party on whom a notice of levy had been served. In addition, suppose the
bankruptcy court ordered the third party to turn over the property to the bankruptcy trustee.
Under such circumstances, it is hard to imagine that the third party would be held personally
liable for the bankrupt's tax under section 6332.
231. The author questions whether the result would have been different if the tax collector
here was the state instead of the federal government and a state regulation or a state statute made
service of a notice of levy tantamount to levy.
232. 527 F.2d 799 (7th Cir.1976).
233. Rule 205(d) permits the trustee or any party in interest to seek the examination of any
person with respect to "the acts, conduct, or property of the bankrupt, or to any matter which
may affect the administration of the bankrupt's estate.. II U.S.C. app. R. 205(d) (Supp. IV
1974).
234. 527 F.2d at 800.
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recovered or collected on behalf of a client. 235 However, attorneys in Illinois
are also afforded a second, independent lien for unpaid fees, the attorney's
common law or retaining lien. This permits an attorney to retain until fees are
paid any property of a client which has come into the attorney's possession
within the scope of his employment.236 Since the lien is possessory and
passive, the attorney cannot foreclose on it and simply is permitted to hold the
documents or other property until he is paid. This retaining lien is strictly a
common law possessory lien and is lost when the attorney surrenders the
property.2 37 It was this latter type of lien which was in issue in Browy.
The Seventh Circuit recognized the common law attorney's lien and
enforced it against the trustee in bankruptcy. 238 The attorney's lien survived
an attack under the trustee's "strongarm" clause, section 70c(3). 239 This
provision gives the trustee the status of a creditor who obtained a lien by legal
proceedings against all of the debtor's property on the date of bankruptcy.
Thus, "[w]henever under the applicable law such a creditor might prevail
over prior transfers, liens, encumbrances or the like, the trustee will also
prevail." 24' The validity of the attorney's retaining lien, therefore, was to be
measured under Illinois law. The question to be answered was whether the
attorney would have prevailed over the subsequent levying creditor if, on the
date of bankruptcy, another creditor of Browy had levied on the documents in
the attorney's hands. The answer under Illinois law is yes, 242 and, therefore,
the attorney's lien was not vulnerable under section 70c of the Act. The court
dismissed the trustee's section 70e attack on the attorney's lien since the
creation of a common law attorney's lien could hardly be a transfer fraudulent
or otherwise voidable by another creditor of the client under state law .243
Thus, the court held that the common law attorney's lien would stand up
against the bankruptcy trustee's avoiding powers.
235. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, § 14 (1975).
236. Jovan v. Starr, 87 Ill. App. 2d 350, 231 N.E.2d 637 (1967).
237. Illinois case law actually recognizes a third type of attorney's lien, an equitable lien,
which arises, if at all, in the contingent fee context. See Lewis v. Braun, 356111. 467,478, 191 N.E.
56, 61 (1934); Smith v. Young, 62 IIl. 210 (1871).
238. Other circuits have long recognized the validity of such liens in bankruptcy. See, e.g.,
Davison v. Callaghan (In re Allied Owners' Corp.), 72 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1934).
239. Bankruptcy Act § 70c(3), II U.S.C. § I10(c)(3) (1970).
240. Lewis v. Manufactures Nat'l Bank (In re Lewis), 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
241. 4A COLLIER, supra note 14, at 559-60.
242. Great American Ins. Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 226 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
243. The trustee apparently did not attack the creation of the lien as a preferential transfer
vulnerable under section 60. I1 U.S.C. § % (1970). Whether the facts permitted such an attack is
not clear. However, it is not difficult to conceive of a situation where such an attack would be
possible. See, e.g., Retention of Moneys Collected by Attorney in Payment of Fees Owed the
Attorney on Account of Legal Services in Unconnected Cases, 52 CHI. BAR REC. 264 (1971). While
in such circumstances a statutory attorney's lien would be saved from being voided under section
60 by the operation of section 67b, a common law attorney's lien would not appear to come within
the saving provision. See also Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(29a), 60d, I I U.S.C. §§ 1(29a), 96(d) (1970).
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The second noteworthy point in Browy is the remedy which the court
fashioned. The court recognized that it was the policy of the Act to require the
trustee to investigate dealings between the bankrupt and his creditors with a
view toward finding transactions vulnerable to the trustee's avoiding powers.
This policy would be frustrated unless the trustee had access to all of the
bankrupt's records, including those in the hands of an attorney for the
bankrupt. Yet, if the attorney turned over the records, the lien would be lost.
Also, if he permitted the trustee to inspect or copy the documents, the
bargaining advantage of the lien would be destroyed. 244 The court attempted
to balance these conflicting considerations by holding that if the trustee
wished to require the attorney to produce the bankrupt's documents in his
possession for inspection, the trustee would have to recognize the claim of the
attorney as fully secured. The effect of this is to create, in essence, a
super-priority class of unsecured creditor. 245
Obviously, the documents cannot be sold to produce proceeds to satisfy
the attorney's claim because the monetary value of the documents is neglig-
ible.24 Therefore, as the Seventh Circuit recognized, the attorney can be paid
only out of the assets which would otherwise be available to unsecured
creditors and if there are no such assets, "he would not be paid in any
event. '247
The logic of Browy is compelling. There seems to be no reason why
attorneys' liens, both statutory and common law, should not be recognized in
bankruptcy if such are recognized under state law. After all, a basic premise
of bankruptcy is that valid secured claims are not affected by the proceed-
ing. 248 Browy does an effective balancing of this policy and the trustee's need
for access to the bankrupt's books and records. It, in effect, leaves it up to the
trustee whether he is willing to pay the price of the attorney's pre-bankruptcy
fee in order to inspect the documents of the bankrupt in the attorney's hands.
In answering that question, the court asserts that the trustee can measure the
importance of that inspection in terms of dollar recoveries that such docu-
ments are likely to produce for the estate. Practically speaking this is the value
244. Comment, Compensation and Lien of Attorney: Whether Attorney is Entitled to Assert
Lien as Basis for Refusal to Produce Records and Papers Subpoenaed in Case Against Client for
Fees, 34 CM.-KENT L. REV. 181 (1956).
245. Under the court's analysis, the attorney is to be paid as a secured creditor and must be
paid before any distribution can be made to unsecured creditors. 527 F.2d at 802. That apparently
means that the attorney comes ahead of all such claims, including the trustee's expenses in
administering the estate.
246. But see Bankruptcy Act § 57h, 1 U.S.C. § 93(h) (1970). It could be argued that in dollar
terms the attorney's claim was in fact unsecured. That would certainly be the case if the trustee
abandoned the documents. See Bankruptcy Rule 306(d), 11 U.S.C. app. R. 306(d) (Supp. IV
1974).
247. 527 F.2d at 802.
248. See Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515, 519-21 (1943).
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of the security which the lawyer ultimately holds.249
Finally, the Seventh Circuit decided two cases which dealt with a
problem which has perplexed bankruptcy courts for many years; the question
of the dischargeability in bankruptcy of obligations arising out of familial
disputes and duties. 25' The basic rule is relatively simple. Section 17a(7) on
dischargeability provides an exception from discharge for liabilities "for
alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or
child. ... 25 The problem is determining just what obligations fit within
the rule. The focus is one of purpose. If the purpose of the judgment or
agreement is to fulfill duties of support, it is not dischargeable. If the purpose
of the underlying obligation is a division of property, it is dischargeable.252
Unfortunately which side of the line a given domestic debt falls on is often far
from clear.
In Nichols v. Hensler,25 3 the Seventh Circuit was confronted with the
question of whether a debt which an Indiana divorce decree labelled as
"alimony" was in fact a property settlement and, thus, dischargeable. 254 In re
249. A number of recent Seventh Circuit bankruptcy decisions involved questions of
attorney's fees and activities in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. Attorney's fees cases
included: SEC v. First Sec. Co., 528 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1976); Limperis v. United Merchants &
Mfr., Inc. (In re Peerless Mfg. Co., 523 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1975)); Anastos v. M.J.D.M. Truck
Rentals Co., 521 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) (involving a
malpractice action by a creditor against his attorney for failing to perfect a judgment lien before
the debtor's bankruptcy. The creditor's malpractice action shared the same fate as its judgment
lien). See Hamilton Steel Prods., Inc. v. Yorke, 376 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1967).
250. Actually, the problem is not confined to bankruptcy courts. By virtue of section 17c(l),
the bankruptcy courts and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to determine the dischargea-
bility of certain kinds of debts, including familial obligations. 11 U.S.C. § 35(c)(1) (1970). Thus,
state courts also have to deal with the question of whether a given claim arising out of a domestic
relations dispute was discharged in a subsequent bankruptcy case. See, e.g., Abrams v. Burg, 327
N.E.2d 745 (Mass. 1975); Morrey v. Morrey, 24 111. App. 3d 77,320 N.E.2d 503 (1974); Pelusio v.
Pelusio, 130 N.J. Super. 538, 328 A.2d 10 (1974).
251. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970). No distinction is drawn between
obligations based on contract, court decree or statute. The same approach is used. However, the
question of whether such obligations are non-provable and, thus, per se non-dischargeable
presents somewhat different issues. See 3A COLLIER, supra note 14, at 1838.
252. Joslin, Bankruptcy From a Family Law Perspective, 4 VAND. L. REV. 789, 798 (1956).
253. 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976).
254. The litigative posture in Nichols is interesting. The divorce was granted in 1960. It
provided for several different payments to the wife, all characterized as alimony. It included
support for the wife, support for a child, and apparently a property settlement as well. Some of
the payments were to stop on the wife's remarriage. The wife remarried and the former husband
stopped all payments, not just those terminable on remarriage. At this time both parties were
living in California where the wife obtained a state court judgment against her ex-husband which
again was characterized as alimony. The ex-husband now deemed it propitious to go back home
to Indiana. The ex-wife followed him there and brought a diversity action based on the California
judgment. After she obtained a judgment for the "alimony" in a federal court, he filed
bankruptcy, scheduling the judgment. The question of dischargeability arose when she sought to
enforce her Indiana federal judgment after his bankruptcy. After the district court denied his
motion to dismiss her supplemental proceeding, he agreed to the entry of the order denying the
motion and providing for a further evidentiary hearing to be held later. He then appealed. The
Seventh Circuit first had to consider whether this order denying the motion to dismiss was final
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Cornish255 involved the question of whether an award of fees to a wife's
attorney in a divorce payable directly by her ex-husband to her attorney was
dischargeable in the husband's subsequent bankruptcy. The court's approach
in these cases was both internally consistent and in accord with prior case law
in the area. In both cases, the court first held that 'alimony' under section
17a(7) means payments in the nature of support for a former spouse." 256 The
court then went on to observe in Nichols that" [i]f the debt is determined to be
one arising under a property settlement, it is discharged in bankruptcy." 257
Whether a debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy is a federal question. 258
The issue to be determined is simply whether the obligation in question is one
of the types which Congress intended to be excepted from the operation of the
bankruptcy discharge and thus included as part of the list in section 17. What a
state denominates as an obligation is not relevant in making this determina-
tion. A state cannot make an apple into an orange by saying hereafter all red
fruit will be called "oranges." Similarly, it cannot transform a property
settlement into non-dischargeable alimony by calling it "alimony." The
question of dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy is within the exclusive
province of Congress and states cannot usurp this function by broadening or
altering the defi-nition of terms which Congress has used. In using the term
"alimony" Congress meant alimony in its traditional support function. 259
The question is whether in fact the debt is one for the provision of support or
the division of property, no matter what the state calls it.
Applying that philosophy in Nichols and Cornish, the Seventh Circuit
held that it was not bound by the state legislature's or court's characterization
of an award as "alimony." Instead, it made an attempt to determine whether
the purpose of the decree was support or property division. In this regard,
however, the court started with the statutory and decisional law of the state
creating the debt. The state statute and case law were relevant only insofar as
they provided a clue as to whether the definition of "alimony" was to be
limited to support payments. Although the court did not articulate it, a logical
inference can be made that if local law limited awards of alimony to support
situations, the bankruptcy court would assume that the state court adhered to
local law and that, therefore, the obligation would be for support and
non-dischargeable. 260
and appealable. The court determined it was because the district court did not intend to consider
further the question of dischargeability. Instead, the contemplated evidentiary hearing was
merely a supplemental proceeding for determining his financial condition and to work out a
method of paying her judgment.
255. Schiller v. Cornish (In re Cornish), 529 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1976).
256. 528 F.2d at 307; 529 F.2d at 1364.
257. 528 F.2d at 307.
258. Note, In Re Waller, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 175 (1976).
259. Merriman v. Hawbaker, 5 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. III. 1934).
260. Waller v. Waller (In re Waller), 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974).
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However, state statutes and case law are rarely so limited. Thus, in both
Cornish and Nichols, it was incumbent on the court to examine whether the
award was in fact one for support. The court was able to determine on the face
of the record in Cornish that the award of counsel fees was in fact for support.
This is in accord with a virtually unbroken line of decisions.261 The record in
Nichols was not so clear. A variety of debts were involved and it was difficult
to tell which fell into which category. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit returned
the case to the trial court for further examination. The Seventh Circuit
carefully told the trial court where to look. 262 Unfortunately, it did not tell the
trial court what to look for.
The search for objective standards in this area has been a major source of
frustration to bankruptcy and domestic relations lawyers alike. 263 Among the
criteria which have been applied in determining whether an "alimony"
obligation was for support or property division are: (1) whether the obligation
called for periodic payments or a lump sum; (2) whether those payments were
for a fixed term without regard to the recipient's death or remarriage; (3)
whether the obligee was a former spouse or a third party; and (4) whether on
the record as a whole there is extrinsic evidence of the parties' or court's
intentions to effect a property settlement or provide for support. 264
None of these criteria seem satisfactory in planning domestic relations
litigation. Instead, it would be better for Congress to adopt the approach
proposed in the Commission's bill which would provide an exception from
the discharge of "any liability to a spouse or child for maintenance or support,
for alimony due or to become due, or under a property settlement in
connection with a separation or divorce decree. "265 While such a solution
261. IA COLLIER, supra note 14, at 1669. It should be noted that, in reversing the district
court on the question of dischargeability of these counsel fees, the Seventh Circuit relied heavily
on Illinois precedent. It did so, however, merely to support its conclusion that the obligation
derived in fact from the husband's support duties to his wife. This is an entirely proper approach
since Illinois precedent interpreted the statute permitting awards of counsel fees in a divorce
from a purpose perspective. See Merriman v. Hawbaker, 5 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. I11. 1934); Morrey
v. Morrey, 24 11. App. 3d 77, 320 N.E.2d 503 (1974).
262. Specifically, the court of appeals suggested that: "The transcript of the divorce
hearing, if one exists, and other evidence of the parties' intentions should be considered. Of
greatest significance will be evidence of the existence or non-existance of other marital
properties not specifically described and allocated in the agreement." 528 F.2d at 309.
263. See, e.g., Labovitz, Alimony, . . . A Rose by Any Other Name May Not Provide the
Same Cent, 80 COM. L.J. 359 (1975); Branca, Dischargeability of Financial Obligations in
Divorce: the Support Obligation and the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Branca].
264. Branca, supra note 263, at 413-18; Loiseaux, Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 41
N. CAR. L. REC. 27 (1962).
265. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-506(a)(6) (1975) (emphasis added). Contrast the
judges' bill which provides as an exception to discharge "any liability to a spouse or child for
maintenance or support, or for alimony due or to become due: Provided however, That a debt
shall not be excepted from discharge hereinunder merely to hold the spouse harmless from her
[sic] obligation in any manner to pay the debt." H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-506(a)(6) (1975).
The "provided, however" clause is meant to overrule In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974).
Otherwise the judges' bill leaves the prior law undisturbed and unresolved.
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may be Draconian, it would at least put an element of predictability into an
area replete with vagueness and inconsistency. Since domestic relations
lawyers often know little of bankruptcy and its possible consequences and
since bankruptcy courts are ill-equipped to deal with domestic squabbles,
such a clear rule will hopefully put an end to the substantial volume of
wasteful litigation.
